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ABSTRACT 
As an emerging geopolitical hotspot, will the future of the Arctic be dominated by 
conflict or cooperation among states? With the potential for vast natural resources and the 
promise of transpolar shipping, the opening Arctic may be the new frontier for global 
competition. This thesis uses two theories of international relations, neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism, to evaluate the geopolitical landscape of an opening Arctic. 
This thesis argues that the characterization of the Arctic as a zone of either 
competition or cooperation is overly simplistic.  While structural neorealist theory can 
accurately account for some of the Arctic countries’ behavior, it is unable to explain 
forms of cooperation existing and emerging among them. In addition to laying out the 
overall state of cooperation and conflict among the Arctic countries, this thesis also 
examines two cases in detail: conflicts between Russia and Norway over the Barents Sea, 
and the United States and Canada over the Northwest Passage. Neorealism fails to 
account fully for the emergence of cooperation in the form of an equitable treaty on the 
maritime delimitation line between Russian and Norway. The international regimes were 
enablers of inter-state cooperation in the U.S.-Canadian case, and were a contributing 
factor in dispute settlement.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM  
  As an emerging geopolitical hotspot, will the future of the Arctic be dominated 
by conflict or cooperation among states? Who are the primary actors and what are the 
primary institutions for the region?  What are the areas of possible conflict and 
cooperation that are specific to an opening Arctic?  Do neorealist or neoliberal theories of 
international relations best describe the geopolitical landscape of an opening Arctic when 
applied to issues of sovereignty? 
Rising interest and heated debate surrounding the Arctic in international relations 
are outstripping even the most extreme environmental predictions for global warming and 
its effects on the polar ice cap.  With potentially vast natural resources and the promise of 
greatly decreased shipping times, the Arctic may be the new frontier for global 
competition. The region has spurred great interest in recent years.  While many of the 
published works debate whether the region will be dominated by conflict or cooperation, 
few have attempted to apply political science theories of international relations to the 
Arctic as a region.  Understanding on what basis the future geopolitical landscape of the 
Arctic will be sculpted is imperative.   
From a national security perspective, the military will likely have growing 
responsibilities in the region as the Arctic continues to develop into an economic zone. 
As Robert Keohane wrote in After Hegemony, “this is essential because economic issues, 
if they are crucial enough to basic national values, may become military-security issues 
as well.”1  An increased presence of military forces has been interpreted as evidence of a 
new era of power politics in the Arctic.  The extent of the military’s role in the region 
should however be determined based on a complete understanding of the likelihood of 
conflict.  Even if outright conflict is avoided and cooperation emerges, the military will 
have a role in monitoring the region for rule compliance and at times will be required to 
                                                 
1 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 39.  
 2 
demonstrate force or presence in the event of rule-breaking.  An increase in presence of 
military forces in the region does not either confirm or undermine theories of 
international cooperation of conflict.  What is necessary is to investigate to what purposes 
military forces are directed. 
Similarly, claims regarding the dominance of cooperation in the region need to be 
evaluated.  Despite assertions that the Arctic has been mostly defined by cooperation 
rather than conflict, disputes over sovereignty remain.  RADM David Titley, the U.S. 
Navy’s Oceanographer, attempts to soothe fears by framing the region in simple terms as 
an ocean, as in this quote:  
What stops the Arctic from being the Wild West? As it turns out, there is 
an internationally agreed governance regime for how we work on the 
oceans. It is called the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
A hundred and sixty countries have ratified the treaty. A handful of 
countries have not; among those are North Korea, Iran, Syria, and the 
United States.2   
This is certainly true to a degree, but it may be an over-simplification given the 
numerous unsettled sovereignty disputes in the region.  The UNCLOS is certainly the 
foundation to international cooperation in the Arctic region.  The fact that the United 
States remains a non-signatory should not be casually dismissed, however, nor should 
states assume that the UNCLOS will provide the only needed framework to solve the 
complex and evolving issues of an open Arctic.  Power politics and the struggle for 
cooperation via institutional regimes like the Arctic Council may well play a role equally 
as large as the UNCLOS does. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the behavior of Arctic states in light of 
international relations theories of cooperation and conflict.  The goal is to understand 
whether power politics are the dominant driver behind Arctic disputes, or whether 
international institutions are bounding competition and shaping cooperative behavior in 
the region.  This thesis will then draw conclusions about the validity of both theories in 
                                                 
2 David Titley, “Global Climate Change,” In The Climate and Energy Symposium 2010 Proceedings 
Book, Johns Hopkins University, 29 March 2011, 35.   
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explaining the Arctic states’ behavior.  The next section develops the specific hypotheses 
that will be examined and evaluated in this thesis. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
Increased commercial activity in the Arctic is certain, even though predictions 
about timeframe vary.  The opening of the Arctic will bring dormant and unresolved 
issues to the forefront as states compete for maritime shipping economies and access to 
hydrocarbon natural resources on the continental shelves.  Therefore, two specific areas 
of sovereignty disputes emerge as appropriate case studies for patterns of cooperation and 
conflict: border disputes and navigable waters disputes.  In order to understand how these 
important issues have been and will be resolved, this thesis will test two theories of 
international relations, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, against two specific 
cases of sovereignty disputes.   
The expectations of state behavior in neorealism are clear.  States will seek to 
maximize their security and use their military power to do so.  States have several 
strategies to pursue power and increase their security: military development and force 
projection, increasing their elements of national power through economic means, and by 
seeking alliances.  Therefore, several predictions arise for this case study.  First, an 
opening Arctic would result in states pursuing resources and economic development of 
the region to boost national power.  Second, the pursuit of economic development will 
bring increased human activity and increased security threats to the region, so we should 
expect an increase in military activity in the region and the development of military 
capability for Arctic operations.  Third, based on the structure of the Arctic we expect 
Canada and Norway to pursue security through an alliance with the United States.  
Finally, states should ignore or break the rules established by international regimes and 
institutions when it is in their interest to do so. 
This thesis argues that the characterization of the Arctic as a zone of either 
competition or cooperation is overly simplistic.  Both theories have some value in 
explaining the behavior of states in the Arctic.  Neorealism, with its focus on elements of 
national power, provides a powerful theoretical explanation for the Arctic states’ interests 
 4 
in the region.  However, voluntary restraints in competition for Arctic resources have 
already emerged and these outcomes are problematic for neorealism.  I expect that 
neoliberal institutionalism will perform better in the Arctic because it accepts many of the 
assumptions of neorealism, such as the pursuit of self-interest by states and the 
importance of power structures, yet offers the flexibility to allow for cooperation by 
states engaged in competition for resources.  Additionally, neoliberal institutionalism 
recognizes the importance of actors other than states.  This key difference should perform 
better in the Arctic region because it is primarily a maritime region, one in which recent 
international legal regimes have allowed for the extension of state control beyond 
traditional land boundaries and their territorial waters.    
C. THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction to International Relations Theory Literature 
In order to proceed, it is necessary to outline some basic definitions and concepts 
used to frame the theoretical frameworks employed in the thesis.  Most of these concepts 
will be common to both case studies, so this short review of international relations theory 
literature will serve as an economical reference point for the rest of the thesis. 
The first framework to be tested will be a structural realist approach that borrows 
heavily from Stephen M. Walt’s The Origins of Alliances and John J. Mearsheimer’s The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  The second framework follows Robert Keohane’s 
neoliberal institutionalism approach and for the North American case study it utilizes 
Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence framework. 
2. Neorealism 
What is power?  Power for neorealists can be divided in two categories, military 
power and latent economic power.3  Military power is the most straightforward measure 
of a state’s power.  It can be calculated by a simple survey the tangible assets of the 
military (e.g., troops, tanks, or tomahawks).  Latent power is, “related to the socio-
                                                 
3 Keohane, After Hegemony, 55. 
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economic ingredients that go into building military power; it is largely based on a state’s 
wealth and the overall size of its population.”4  In realist terms military power is the 
crucial factor, but economic power is also important because it indicates the level of 
potential resources it can draw from to wage war. 
The geographical distribution of power in neorealism is crucial in addition to the 
simple calculation of a state’s power.  Structural realism, or neorealism, as described by 
John J. Mearsheimer, places a premium on the relationship of states to each other in 
terms of power in order to describe interstate behavior.5  Mearsheimer claims that states 
seek power in order to survive, and that states that acquire substantial power are “strongly 
inclined to seek regional hegemony.”6  This has important implications for the Arctic 
region.  If the structure is multi-polar and unbalanced, then according to structural 
neorealism it will be more prone to conflict as the regional power seeks out regional 
hegemony.7   The structure of the system is also important when considering Stephen M. 
Walt’s theories of alliance formation. 
According to Walt, power is important but is not the most critical factor in 
choosing allies.  Instead, it is the perception of threat that determines what a state does.8  
Factors of power are therefore combined with factors of “geographic proximity, offensive 
power, and aggressive intentions.”9  Threat does not necessarily have to be overt in 
neorealism.  A regional power’s military capability alone may be enough to create fear in 
a weaker power.  Therefore, structure as well as state actions can feed threat perception.  




                                                 
4 Ibid., 55. 
5 John J. Mearhseimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: Norton and Company), 
2001, 13. 
6 Ibid., 232. 
7 Ibid., 344. 
8 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21–22. 
9 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 22. 
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strategy emerges when states ally with other lesser powers to counter a greater regional 
power.  The bandwagon strategy predicts an alliance between a lesser power and a more 
threatening greater power in the region.10 
3. Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Before exploring the differences between the two theories it is crucial to 
acknowledge some similarities neoliberal institutionalism has with neorealism.  First, 
they are both structural theories that acknowledge power relationships in the international 
system.  Second, they both take the state as the primary actor and both assume the state 
will act rationally.  Finally, both assume that the system of international relations is 
inherently anarchic, and that states will pursue their self-interests.  Keohane concludes 
that states seek wealth and power because they are complementary and that rhetoric about 
global welfare is just political cheap talk.11   
Neoliberal institutionalism offers a theoretical alternative to neorealist predictions 
of perpetual conflict.  It differs from neorealism in three fundamental ways.  First, while 
neorealism assumes that states are the primary actors and that they are rational unitary 
actors, neoliberal institutionalism allows for multiple channels of connectedness between 
states.12 Second, when such channels exist and are costly to break, states are in a 
condition of complex interdependence, where there is no clear hierarchy of issues. While 
neorealism predicts that military security will always retain primacy in interstate 
relations, neoliberal institutionalism predicts that, under conditions of complex 
interdependence, the hierarchy of the agenda is usually neither clear nor consistent.  
Neorealism focuses on military power and the threat to use force to achieve state goals.  
Neoliberals suggest that, in a complex interdependent relationship, the use of military 
force between the states in the relationship is not a realistic option for solving disputes.  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 178–179. 
11 Keohane, After Hegemony, 22. 
12 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
Harper Collins, 1989), 24–25. 
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Finally, neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes that international regimes such as the 
UNCLOS can generate interest in cooperation rather than conflict.13  
The primary difference between the two theories rests on the role of international 
regimes and interdependence in producing cooperation between states pursuing self-
interest in an anarchical environment.  As Keohane’s theory describes the process, states 
“develop institutions and practices that will enable them to cooperate more effectively 
without renouncing the pursuit of self-interest.”14   This thesis uses his definition of 
cooperation that distinguishes it from the “invisible hand” concept of harmony that is 
found in liberal economic market theory.  Instead, “cooperation requires that the actions 
of separate individuals or organizations- which are not in pre-existent harmony- be 
brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation.”15  To do this 
states establish and rely on international regimes.   
International regimes are defined as, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations.”16  “International regimes are valuable to 
governments not because they enforce binding rules on others (they do not), but because 
they render it possible for governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with 
one another.”17  This process is called “bargaining” and is the key to neoliberal 
institutionalism theory.  States will weigh the costs of conflict and are willing constrain 
their power in situations where they have common interests and will both mutually 
benefit. 
From the neoliberal institutionalism approach, international regimes and 
institutions are important actors in international relations.  International regimes are 
defined as, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
                                                 
13 Keohane, After Hegemony, 63–64. 
14 Ibid., 30. 
15 Keohane, After Hegemony, 51. 
16 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. 
17 Keohane, After Hegemony, 13. 
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procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.”18  “International regimes are valuable to governments not because they 
enforce binding rules on others (they do not), but because they render it possible for 
governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with one another.”19  This 
process is called “bargaining” and is the key to neoliberal institutionalism.  States will 
weigh the costs and benefits of conflict and cooperation and are willing constrain their 
power in situations where they have common interests and will both mutually benefit.  
Complex interdependence, by allowing for multiple channels of communication between 
states, allows for these regimes to play an important role in interstate relations.   
D. METHODS AND SOURCES  
To evaluate the two approaches, this thesis will address several neorealist issues.  
It will attempt to characterize the structure of the Arctic region in neorealist terms as 
Waltz did in his book, Theory of International Politics.20  From this characterization it 
will seek to understand the likelihood of conflict.  Once the structure is outlined this 
thesis will test Walt’s theory of alliance formation.21  Finally, it will consider the 
predictions of state behavior offered by Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism.22 
For the neoliberal theoretical test this thesis will look at the role of international 
organizations in Arctic governance.23  The primary institutions and regimes to be 
investigated will be the United Nations (and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), 
as well as the Arctic Council.  For the Neoliberal approach this thesis will address several 
issues.  First, this thesis will investigate the assumption that states act rationally and that 
rule-based regimes allow them to benefit over time through cooperation, and that those 
benefits outweigh the costs of constraining their behavior in the short term.  Second, it 
                                                 
18 Robert Keohane, “The demand for international regimes,” in Stephen Krasner ed., International 
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 141. 
19 Keohane, After Hegemony, 13. 
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
21 Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
22 Mearhseimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 364–365. 
23 Keohane, After Hegemony, 12. 
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will examine the international regimes in the Arctic and highlight established rules, and 
evidence of compliance and non-compliance.  Third, it will identify evidence of 
international regimes acting as forums for discussion and bargaining, and ultimately to 
assess whether they enhance cooperation in the Arctic region.  Finally, it will examine the 
impact of complex interdependence on the relationship between the United States and 
Canada.24 
The first case study will focus on Norway and Russia’s recently resolved border 
dispute in the Barents Sea.  This case involves two of the most prominent littoral Arctic 
states and at the surface demonstrates the cooperative approach to Arctic dispute 
resolution.  The resolution of a border dispute in a known resource-rich area will offer a 
relevant test of the two international relations theories.  The neoliberal theory can be 
tested in this case to examine the role of international organizations and regimes in the 
bargaining process.  Does the relative power of the State exert more influence on final 
outcomes than negotiation within a rule-based framework?  Once a decision has been 
agreed to, what role will the Arctic Council and the UN play in enforcing and monitoring 
them?  
Analyzing this case study through a neorealism lens will address a different set of 
issues.  The first issue is to determine the relative power of both states in the structure of 
the international system and the Arctic.  The second problem is identifying their behavior 
and strategic goals in the region to determine the “balance of threat” structure. In addition 
to power and intentions, the relationship between the states must be investigated.  
Neorealists assume that states inherently mistrust each other and that a level of fear 
always exists between states and that they are constantly attempting to shift the balance 
of power in their favor.  In this case study the dispute is resolved and therefore the 
outcome can be examined and evaluated to fully test both theoretical approaches.  If the 
calculation of power is found to be widely disparate yet the results of the settlement are 
mutually beneficial then the neoliberal approach may demonstrate a stronger ability to 
explain the behavior of Norway and Russia during the dispute resolution. 
                                                 
24 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 165. 
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The second case study will focus on the dispute over the legal definition of the 
Northwest Passage that exists between the United States and Canada and the broader 
implications of contested access to new maritime trade routes in the Arctic.  Mearsheimer 
argues that states are “always searching for opportunities to gain power over their 
rivals.”25  In this case, long-standing allies are vying for relative power over the future of 
maritime shipping in the Arctic.  If Canada can successfully secure the Northwest 
Passage as internal waters rather then an international strait, it stands to gain relative 
power over the United States in terms of latent socio-economic power.  This thesis will 
investigate how both states pursue this self-interest.  Additionally, using Walt’s alliance 
theory to understand Russia’s impact on the North American allies may hold explanatory 
power for the current state of Arctic affairs between the two states.  
If both states work within the boundaries of international regimes and institutions 
it will support the neoliberal perspective; if both states break the rules of the international 
regimes and institutions the case study will support the neorealist hypotheses.  
The neoliberal theory, when applied to the Northwest Passage dispute, is 
interesting because both the United States and Canada share a history of cooperation, 
interdependence, and deeply rooted mutual interests. However, as Keohane states, “even 
where common interests exist, cooperation often fails.”26  One of the difficulties of this 
case study will be identifying the institutional role that the UN and the UNCLOS will 
play in what has been traditionally cast as a bilateral dispute.    
The purpose of this thesis is not to analyze each side’s legal justifications or 
positions, instead it will seek out and illuminate actions taken by each country that fall 
within the framework of both theoretical approaches.  Ultimately, the goal is to determine 
which theory performs better in this specific case of a sovereignty dispute in the Arctic.   
This thesis will be based on qualitative historical study and analysis of two case 
studies, the Barents Sea dispute between Russia and Norway, and the Northwest Passage 
                                                 
25 John J. Mearhseimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: Norton and 
Company), 29. 
26 Keohane, After Hegemony, 6. 
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dispute between the United States and Canada.  Primary source documents like the 
Ilulissat Declaration, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Barents Sea 
boundary treaty between Norway and Russia, the national Arctic strategy documents, and 
data concerning material wealth and power indicators will establish the empirical basis of 
this thesis.  Secondary sources will be utilized to examine the actions taken by each state 
in pursuit of their Arctic goals.  Scholarly secondary sources and commentary from major 
news outlets will supplement the primary sources to provide a complete and updated 
picture of the interactions between the primary Arctic actors and institutions.     
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized as follows.  Chapter I has provided an organizational 
overview of the thesis as well as a review of the pertinent theoretical literature on 
international relations.   Chapter II will be an empirical background of Arctic issues and 
the national strategies of the Arctic states.  This Chapter will also establish the basic 
assumptions of the thesis on climate change.  Chapter III is the case study on the 
sovereignty disputes in the Barents Sea between Norway and Russia.  Chapter IV 
examines the North American Arctic relationship and explores the Northwest Passage 
case study.  Chapter V will offer evaluations of the strength of the two theories and 
conclusions on how disputes in the Arctic region have been negotiated or solved and the 
role of either neorealist or neoliberal paradigms in doing so. 
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II. ARCTIC AFFAIRS OVERVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND: CLIMATE CHANGE 
This thesis does not address the specific debates over climate change predictions 
in the Arctic, but does assume that the Arctic is warming and in turn will continue to 
become more accessible to human activity.  The basis of this position is drawn from the 
United States’ official “National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security 
Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030,” which utilized multiple government 
sources as well as the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) for its position on global climate change.27  This government document describes 
general trends of rising global temperatures and rising sea levels and notes that, “in some 
cases, changes in ecosystems and natural resources are occurring faster and with larger 
magnitude than scientists anticipated as recently as ten years ago.   Temperatures in the 
Arctic are rising almost twice as fast as the global rate.”28  While the predicted 
timeframes for ice-free Arctic summers varies widely, there is strong multi-disciplinary 
consensus on the reality of a melting Arctic.  “Global climate change has catapulted the 
Arctic into the centre of geopolitics, as melting Arctic ice transforms the region from one 
of primarily scientific interest into a maelstrom of competing commercial, national 
security and environmental concerns, with profound implications for the international 
legal and political system.”29  Thus, the Arctic is a rapidly changing region with 
significant economic and security interests for the states that surround it.   
                                                 
27 U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Energy Independence and 
Global Warming, National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global 
Climate Change to 2030 (Washington, DC: Subcommittee on Intelligence, Energy Independence, and 
Global Warming, 2008), 2–4. 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 Charles K. Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The geopolitics of arctic melt,” International Affairs 
85:6 (November, 2009): 12–15. 
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B. NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE ARCTIC FIVE 
1. The United States 
The United States refocused its strategic interests in the Arctic in January 2009, 
with the signing of National Security Presidential Directive 66, the Arctic Region Policy.  
This document outlines the policy and goals for the United States in the Arctic.  NSPD 66 
frames the Arctic as an area where “The United States has broad and fundamental 
national interests…and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with 
other states to safeguard these interests.”30   
There are two phases of policy analysis employed here. The first phase is a review 
of what the goals and objectives of the policy are; the second is a look at how the state 
plans to achieve them.  The goals outlined by the U.S. Arctic policy (NSPD-66) are 
summarized here:  Defense of the homeland, projection of sea power in the Arctic 
maritime domain, securing sovereign rights and economic interests, and maintaining 
freedom of navigation.31  In order to achieve these goals, NSPD-66 directs the 
development of Arctic capabilities necessary to protect the United States, and also directs 
the increase in maritime domain awareness capabilities.  The Arctic is a maritime 
frontier, and the United States has signaled its intent to develop it using traditional tools 
of national power, the sea services.  These objectives alone, however, do not translate to 
an Arctic power buildup; to understand the overall strategy outlined in the policy, the 
implementation sections must be examined. 
The U.S. policy emphasis on cooperation in the Arctic is significant; the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review, which followed NSPD-66, suggests the importance of 
cooperation in “preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and 
partners.”32  NSPD-66 directs the government to cooperate with other countries on Arctic 
                                                 
30 George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive/HSPD 25,” January 2009, 2. 
31 Bush, “NSPD 66/HSPD 25,” 2.   
32 U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010, 57. 
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issues primarily through the United Nations.  However, it also suggests considering “new 
or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic.”33   
As the lead department for the maritime domain, the U.S. Navy published the 
Arctic roadmap late in 2009.   This document outlined and identified the requirements 
and responsibilities for achieving the goals specified in NSPD 66 and directed the 
development of a five-year plan for implementation.  What should be noted from the 
perspective of strategy is that cooperation was assumed before the Navy’s strategic 
objectives were even defined.  The “desired effect” section stated that the Navy should be 
“engaged in strong cooperative partnerships that preserve a safe, stable, and secure Arctic 
region.”34 By May 2010 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughhead, 
released the official Navy Strategic Objectives for the Arctic Memorandum.  This 
outlined two key areas emphasizing cooperation.  The first was the Navy’s role in 
“contributing” to the security, safety, and stability of the Arctic.  The second was a 
requirement to “strengthen existing and foster new cooperative relationships in the 
region.”35  The overall goals outlined in the Navy Strategic guidance match those 
outlined in NSPD-66 for security, defense, protection of U.S. interests, and development 
of capabilities.   
Beyond signaling renewed interest in the region and a willingness to cooperate, 
the U.S. strategy documents do not define how the goals will be pursued, nor what 
specific institutions it is prepared to utilize to do so. There is wide consensus in the 
literature that the United States is a “late-comer” to the post-Cold War Arctic with most 
citing the United State’s dismal polar icebreaker fleet readiness as an example.36   
However, the persistence of the dispute with Canada over the legal definition of the 
                                                 
33 Bush, “NSPD 66/HSPD 25,” 3–4. 
34 Navy Taskforce Climate Change, “U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap,” U.S. Navy, Washington, D.C., 
October 2009, 7. 
35 Chief of Naval Operations, “Navy Strategic Objectives for the Arctic,” U.S. Navy, Washington 
D.C., May 2010, 5. 
36 Olaf Osica, “The High North as a New Area of Cooperation and Rivalry,” Nowa Europa Special 
Issue, vol. 1, no. 4, 2010. 
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Northwest Passage indicates that there are significant unresolved disputes that also 
demonstrate the nascency of the U.S. policy on the Arctic.37  
2. Canada 
Canada’s approach to the Arctic can be best exemplified by the renaming of the 
Northwest Passage in 2009 as the “Canadian Northwest Passage.”38   Political name 
changing was reported as early as 2006 to assert Canada’s sovereignty claims that the 
passage represents internal waters and is not an international strait as the United States 
claims.39  One thing is clear, that Canada takes its Arctic sovereignty seriously.   Next to 
Russia, Canada has the most extensive area of Arctic territory and by extension has much 
to lose if any state brings competing Exclusive Economic Zone claims. Canada’s policy 
has been to secure its claims, while preventing conflict.   
As Robert Huebert points out in the conclusion of an edited volume on the topic, 
the geopolitical environment of the Arctic is in transition.  This transition is exacerbated 
by two facts.  First, “the legal definition of the ocean boundaries of the Arctic is in flux,” 
due to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Second, 
military and coast guard capabilities are being increased by most of the Arctic nations.40  
Transition periods are unsettling to those in power.  This notion goes a long way in 
explaining Canadian perspectives, as well as Russian perspectives. Both countries are 
described as “Arctic Warriors” in their approaches to the Arctic.41 
                                                 
37 Ted L. McDorman, “Canada’s Ocean Jurisdiction in the Arctic: An Overview of Maritime 
Boundary Issues,” in Thawing Ice- Cold War, ed. Rob Huebert (Winnipeg, Canada: University of 
Manitoba, 2009), 9–24. 
38 “Arctic Strategy Documents,” Geopolitics of the Nigh North, 
http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84&Itemid=69&limitst
art=4.   
39 NathanVanderklippe, “Northwest passage gets a political name change,” The Edmonton Journal, 
April 9, 2006, http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=6d4815ac-4fdb-4cf3-a8a6–
4225a8bd08df&k=73925. 
40 Robert Huebert, “Understanding Sovereignty and Security in a Changing Canadian Arctic,” in 
Thawing Ice- Cold War, ed. Rob Huebert (Winnipeg, Canada: University of Manitoba, 2009), 122. 
41 Osica, “The High North as a New Area of Cooperation and Rivalry,” 21. 
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3. Russia 
Russian approaches to the Arctic can be viewed in terms of a central theme, 
strategic resources.  One side of the resource coin is Russia’s interest in claiming 
potentially resource-rich territory, which Roger Howard does a fine job of summarizing.  
First he notes that: 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 grants 
‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting ... natural 
resources’ over a 200nm exclusive economic zone from the coast.  This 
gives Russia a large maritime presence beyond its northernmost territory, 
Franz Josef Land in the Barents Sea. Sovereign rights over a wider area 
(up to 150nm) can be claimed if it can be demonstrated that the outer 
continental shelf ‘the natural prolongation of its land territory’ – reaches 
beyond the 200nm limit.  
Howard goes on to outline Russia’s strategic approach to Arctic resources: 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has claimed that the Arctic 
represents Russia’s new ‘resource base’ for the twenty-first century, and in 
May 2009 the Kremlin argued, in a new national-security document, that 
‘in a competition for resources, it can’t be ruled out that military force 
could be used for resolving emerging problems’.42 
The other side of the resource coin is the expected increase in interest in the 
region by states other than Russia and the resulting increase in traffic and activity in 
Russia’s strategic front porch.  With increased economic and military activity likely, 
Russia sees conflict possible as foreign entities encroach within a sphere that has seen 
little incursion throughout history.   It is this strategic aspect of the Arctic that Roger 
Howard argues is the most important to Russia.43  Attempts by Russia to restrict access 
to a navigable northern maritime zone mimic Canada’s approach.  Much like Canada and 
the Northwest Passage, the Russians claim a legal jurisdiction over the Northern Sea 
route and contest Canada’s interpretation of it as an international strait.44 
                                                 
42 Roger Howard, “Russia’s New Front Line,” Survival 52, no. 2 (April 2010): 141–156. 
43 Ibid., 145–146. 
44 Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy Ambitions and Constraints,” Joint Forces Quarterly 57, 
no. 2 (2010): 103–110. 
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This paints a troubling picture for the other Arctic nations.  With its geographic 
and demographic domination of the Arctic, Russia’s approaches to the Arctic have been 
alarming to certain other states, particularly when that rhetoric has been backed up by 
increases in Russian military activity in the region and the infamous planting of the 
Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole.45  However, Katarzyna Zisk argues that 
despite assertive rhetoric and bold military maneuvers, the fact that Russia has repeatedly 
given “assurances that Moscow would regulate Arctic issues through negotiations and 
with respect for the rules of international law” should give other states reassurance that 
the Russians intend to utilize diplomatic approaches to Arctic issues.46  This view is 
supported by Russia’s attempts to claim EEZ extensions in accordance with UNCLOS 
frameworks, and with its recent settlement of the boundary dispute in the Barents Sea 
with Norway.47 
4. Norway 
The Norwegian government issued its first “High North Strategy” in 2006, and 
then updated it in 2009.  The objectives and policy priorities were to “exercise authority,” 
to be a good “steward” who safeguards the environment and indigenous populations 
while developing the Arctic, and, finally, to be a leader in international affairs of the 
region while strengthening cooperation with Russia.48  Since Norway relies on oil and 
petroleum as a primary source of national income, Oslo’s interest in Arctic resource 
development is high.49  Norway’s size relative to its massive Arctic neighbor Russia has 
compelled the Norwegians to seek out cooperation in the region, especially with Russia, 
but also with regional institutions such as NATO.  Of the Nordic states Norway has the 
most military assets dedicated to the Arctic. 
                                                 
45 Roderick Kefferputz, “On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North.” Centre 
for European Policy Studies 205 (2010): 1–9. 
46 Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy Ambitions and Constraints,” 109. 
47 For a good summary of the issue see Holtsmark, Sven G. and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor eds, 
“Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?”  NATO Defense College Forum thesis 
7 (May, 2009): 88–91. 
48 Geopolitics of the Nigh North, “Arctic Strategy Documents.”  
49 Osica, “The High North as a New Area of Cooperation and Rivalry,” 27. 
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5. Denmark and Greenland 
Denmark, and in the past, Greenland under Denmark have been quite successful 
in resolving Arctic disputes.  They have settled disputes with Canada, Iceland, and 
Norway.  Although all the disputes were negotiated on a bilateral basis, the dispute with 
Norway over Jan Mayen was first settled in the International Court of Justice.50  In fact, 
Nordic cooperation has been so successful that it has been suggested in the literature as 
another avenue in the management of Arctic issues.51  The historical experience of the 
Nordic states with respect to Russia no doubt fuels the high level of cooperation between 
them.   
6. Finland 
Finland, while not a true littoral Arctic state, has also generated a strategy 
document and expressed interest in the region.  The Finnish document emphasizes 
cooperation through the established international legal framework of the UNCLOS and 
the inter-governmental Arctic Council.  Finland defines its objectives as maintaining an 
influence in Arctic affairs within the European Union and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 
as well as preserving and protecting the environment and indigenous people.  The 
document also recognizes the possibility of resource wealth and the desire for a Finnish 
contribution to the economic development and commerce of the region.52  In summary, 
the Nordic States can be described as pragmatic.  They seem interested in solving the 
Arctic disputes in a method that limits conflict in order to develop commerce in the 
Arctic, all while acknowledging the region’s fragile eco-system and the need to protect it. 
                                                 
50 Holtsmark, “Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?” 89. 
51 Alyson J. K. Bailes,  “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is needed?” in 
Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze? Eds. Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. 
Smith-Windsor, NATO Defense College Forum Paper 7 (May 2009): 52. 
52 Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, August 2010.  
http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/images/stories/attachments/Finland.pdf 
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C. SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE ARCTIC REGION  
The survey of the Arctic state strategies illuminates several recurring security 
issues.  The primary issue is the interpretation of international law and the settling of 
disputes between states over differences in interpretations.  International ocean law, 
which is of prime concern for the Arctic, is centered on the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which over 150 countries (including all Arctic States, 
except the United States) have ratified.53  However, Holtsmark points out that “UNCLOS 
is a legal regime, not an institution; its solutions must be formulated in regard to 
individual nations and also implemented by them.”54  What institutions can address these 
issues?   
The five Arctic powers signed the Ilulissat Declaration in May 2008, which above 
all established that the signatories would “approach the next phase of High North 
challenges in a cooperative, peaceful, responsible, market-based and law abiding 
mode.”55 However, it also proclaimed that the states “did not see the need for a new 
comprehensive international legal regime.”56  This leads to the conclusion that the Arctic 
powers are committed to resolving disputes peacefully within the international legal 
framework of the UNCLOS, but probably bilaterally and not through an institution. 
Strategic security issues are difficult to define for the Arctic.  Almost all the 
issues can be classified as strategic and security issues, from high-end military 
operational questions to environmental and indigenous population questions.  This thesis 
will define the strategic security challenges as purely military, with full recognition that 
even military operations will be connected to the entire spectrum of Arctic issues.   
The military security challenges begin with Arctic operational capability gaps and 
maritime domain awareness challenges.  Rear Admiral David Titley, the U.S. 
Oceanographer of the Navy, recently outlined some of those security considerations from 
                                                 
53 Holtsmark, “Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?” 84. 
54 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is needed?” 50. 
55 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?” 50. 
56 Ibid., 50. 
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a Naval perspective and highlighted the following challenges: “lack of support 
infrastructure and logistics support, environmental hazards, and communications 
difficulties.  Antiquated nautical charts, drifting ice, low visibility, and the paucity of 
electronic and visual navigation aids hinder safety of navigation.  A lack of coastal 
installations also contributes to the difficulty of search and rescue (SAR) operations.”57  
These challenges are from an American perspective, but these issues affect all military 
operators in the Arctic, even the more experienced ones such as Russia and Canada.  
Since the end of the Cold War no international or regional security institution has been 
heavily involved in military security cooperation in the Arctic. 
The non-military end of the security spectrum is comprised of issues such as 
environmental concerns, safe economic development, and scientific research.  These 
issues are all complex and interconnected.  The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as 
a high level forum for the five littoral Arctic nations as well as Iceland, Finland, and 
Sweden for addressing these issues.  The crucial aspect to note is that “the Arctic Council 
works by consensus.  It has no regulatory mandate and relies on building consensual 
knowledge and understandings.”58  It does, however, have a unique feature, which 
qualifies it to address the “responsible development” goals that all the Arctic states have 
professed for the region.  “A special feature of the cooperation is the role given to six 
groups of indigenous peoples: as “permanent participants” they participate in decision-
making along with the eight states.”59   
This is just a high level overview of the myriad security issues discussed in the 
literature, but it is also an attempt to categorize them for the following discussion of 
international institutions and their ability to address the security challenges of the Arctic.  
In the interest of space and the need to focus on the institutions, in depth discussion of the 
security issues has been curtailed. 
                                                 
57 David W. Titley and Courtney C.  St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s 
Roadmap for the Arctic,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (2010), 35–48. 
58 Alf Hoel, “The High North Legal-Political Regime.”  Security prospects in the High North: 
geostrategic thaw or freeze? in Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze? Eds. 
Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, NATO Defense College Forum Paper 7 (May 2009): 
94. 
59 Ibid., 94. 
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D. INSTITUTIONS FOR ARCTIC SECURITY COOPERATION  
1. The United Nations and The Law of the Sea 
The United Nations serves as the international legal framework body for the 
Arctic predominantly through the UNCLOS.  The UNCLOS “provides a good basis for 
handling a large bundle of the issues involving territorial jurisdiction, resource extraction, 
navigation and environment protection, but the United States, alone among Arctic 
Council members, has yet to ratify it.”60  There is wide consensus on the viability of the 
UNCLOS across the Arctic nations.  However, the Senate has been resistant to accession 
so far despite widespread support in the executive branch of the government, security 
think tanks, and within the U.S. Navy.61 As a signatory to the Ilulissat Declaration the 
United States has agreed that “the law of the sea provides for important rights and 
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the 
protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of 
navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to 
this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”62  
Despite the language in the Ilulissat Declaration, there does not seem to be a clear 
consensus in the literature on how issues will be resolved as long as the United States has 
not ratified the UNCLOS.   
2. The European Union 
Since 2008 the European Union has demonstrated ambitions and interests in the 
Arctic region.  The EU Commission released a communiqué on the EU and the Arctic 
region outlining 3 primary policy objectives: “protecting and preserving the Arctic in 
unison with its population, promoting sustainable use of resources, and contributing to 
                                                 
60 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?” 48.  
61 Ronald O’Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional 
Research Service, (October 15, 2010).  
62 The Ilulissat Declaration, The Arctic Council, (May 2008), 
http://www.ambmoskva.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/08609E4F-8D34–4174-A419-
A65547B317F0/0/ArcticOceanConference.pdf.   
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enhanced Arctic multilateral governance.”63  As with most EU approaches to the high 
politics of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), rhetoric nearly always outstrips 
action.  Other than small-scale recommendations, like market bans on seal products, the 
goals outlined are couched in language that suggests rhetorical approaches in lieu of 
action for the first two goals.  The third goal of promoting Arctic governance presents an 
interesting claim for the Arctic States.  It boldly states, “There is no specific treaty regime 
for the Arctic.  No country or group of countries have sovereignty over the North Pole or 
the Arctic Ocean around it.”64  This is obviously a shot across the bow at the Ilulissat 
Declaration.  That declaration, although brimming with noble statements about 
cooperation and transparency, can be viewed as an attempt by the Arctic five to take 
control of the region.  Kefferputz noted, “This declaration, however, was primarily 
designed to reaffirm the sovereignty of the Arctic five in the High North, thus insulating 
the region from other interested actors.”65  The EU Commission obviously sees this as 
problematic.  Ultimately in its objectives section the Commission hedges its goals to 
simply supporting the existing legal frameworks and promoting dialogue and integration 
of Arctic concerns into EU policies.   
In October 2008, the EU Parliament issued a resolution that recommended a 
differing approach with regards to governance, specifically the creation of a new treaty 
based on the Antarctic Treaty.66  Keeping in mind that Arctic issues fall under the EU’s 
CFSP, which is still a new concept within the Union, it is understandable that the separate 
EU institutions will have differing approaches to the region.  Ultimately, as Olaf Osica 
points out, a common critique of the EU is that, “despite Union declarations recognizing 
the Arctic as one of the key areas of its future activity, it is not quite certain whether the 
                                                 
63 “The European Union and the Arctic Region, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council,”  (November 2008), 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=483680:EN:NOT. 
64 EU Commission, “The European Union and the Arctic Region, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,” 9. 
65 Roderick Kefferputz, “On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North.” Centre 
for European Policy Studies 205 (February 2010): 6. 
66 European Parliament, “Resolution on Arctic Governance,” (October 2008).  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008–0474.   
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EU will actually be able to fulfill the role it has ascribed itself.”67  The states most 
concerned with the Arctic in Europe will have to choose which institutions or 
arrangements they want to work through, if any, on Arctic issues.  The intergovernmental 
approach to the CFSP within the EU will ensure that no action is taken contrary to the 
interests of the Arctic countries, despite the Commission’s policies. 
3. NATO 
No discussion of NATO’s role in the Arctic can go far without addressing Russia.  
As an Arctic power with a particular historical sensitivity to NATO, Russian views on the 
alliance’s role in the High North are not favorable.  The following high-level media 
dialogue captured by Ronald O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service 
demonstrates the cooperation gap.  First, in October 2009, NATO Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated, “I think it is within the scope of work for NATO to be 
the forum for consultation and discussion on [selected Arctic] issues.” This statement was 
followed by Russia’s ambassador to NATO stating that “Moscow would not cooperate 
with the alliance on Arctic matters.”  In September 2010, Russian President Medvedev 
elevated the rhetoric significantly by stating that his government “views [possible 
NATO] activity with quite serious tension.”68 This time period also witnessed tension 
between Russia and NATO over ballistic missile defense in Europe as well as the conflict 
in Georgia, which could have resulted in strong anti-NATO rhetoric reverberating into 
discussions of the Arctic.  In any case, cooperation between NATO and Russia on 
security issues and military operations in the Arctic seems to be a remote possibility in 
the current political climate. 
From the NATO perspective, involvement in the Arctic seems an obvious 
requirement.  4 of the five Circumpolar Arctic countries are members of the Alliance.  As 
the transatlantic link between two of the 3 power poles surrounding the Arctic it seems 
perfectly suited to deal with security issues in the High North.  While particular missions 
deriving from Arctic security requirements will likely be parsed across the civil-military 
                                                 
67 Osica, “The High North as a New Area of Cooperation and Rivalry,” 41. 
68 O’Rourke, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” 35. 
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spectrum, there is no doubt that tasks like maritime domain awareness and search and 
rescue, as well as the operation of remote installations are all firmly within the domain of 
modern military operations.69  In the best scenario, NATO would be a forum for 
continued partnership and military preparedness that would allow for “sustainable 
stability,” not against a single threat as in the Cold War, but against multiple threats. 70 
As a credible military alliance NATO has a significant head start on other institutions in 
terms of capabilities.  Regardless of capability, the alliance will only achieve success 
when all the members agree to a goal.  If consensus cannot be reached within the 
Alliance, then the Arctic five may resort to other arrangements to resolve Arctic issues.   
4. The Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council is an informal high-level institutional international regime for 
the Arctic.  This intergovernmental forum is billed as the primary venue for international 
cooperation in the Arctic and has generated legally binding agreements on search and 
rescue.  The Council is made up of the five coastal Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the United States) as well as Finland, Iceland, and Sweden.71   
5. OSCE 
Outside of the Arctic Council, the only other institution (aside from the United 
Nations and its subordinate or associated bodies, such as the IAEA) that all circumpolar 
states are a member of is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE).72  Bailes argues that while no one current institution can address the spectrum 
of Arctic security issues, all issues can be covered piecemeal by existing institutions.73  
So where would the OSCE fit in?  The most significant aspect of the OSCE’s role in the 
Arctic would be the equal footing it gives Russia in shaping the agenda.  In an interesting 
                                                 
69 Holtsmark, “Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?” 25. 
70 Holtsmark, “Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze?” 26. 
71 The Arctic Council, “About the Arctic Council,” http://arctic-council.org/article/about.  
72 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?” 47. 
73 Ibid., 51. 
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document from a 2008 OSCE annual security review conference, Russia proposed a plan 
to cooperate and notify OSCE members of planned naval activities in and around 
Europe.74  This document outlined steps to cooperate and share information on naval 
activities among member nations, but it outlined significant restraints as well.  Little 
discussion on the document is available, and it was likely disregarded as too tight a noose 
on American sovereignty.  However, it does suggest that Russia would look favorably 
upon enhanced maritime cooperation in the Arctic under the OSCE, in which it has more 
influence than in NATO.   
E. CONCLUSIONS  
Several clear areas of consensus emerge from this overview.  The first area 
concerns acceptance of global climate change and the effect it has on ice coverage in the 
Arctic.  Although estimates differ on the timeline, most agree that within the next few 
decades significant portions of the Arctic will experience ice-free summers.  Second, 
there is widespread belief that vast natural resources are present in the region ranging 
from oil and gas to fisheries.  Finally, implementation of continental shelf extension 
claims under UNCLOS will be a source of disagreement and potential conflict.   
The primary areas that do not exhibit a strong consensus in the literature are the 
practical approaches to operating in the Arctic and Russian relations and ambitions.  All 
the Arctic states profess to believe that cooperation is paramount for success in the 
Arctic, but when it comes to specific capability development the dialogue dries up and 
each nation seems to be developing operational capabilities separately.  While states 
recognize the challenges and warn of the dangers of Arctic competition, little to no 
discussion of how to overcome those challenges through security cooperation has 
emerged.  Russia, in particular, seems to be the most difficult actor to clearly understand 
in the Arctic.  Between aggressive dialogue and increasing military activity in the high 
north, Russia can at times be intimidating in its approach to preserving its Arctic 
                                                 
74 Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, “Confidence and Security-Building Measures in 
the Naval Area,” 2008 OSCE Annual Security Review Conference  (July 2008), 
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sovereignty and influence.  However, significant examples of support for international 
legal frameworks and cooperation also emerge. 
By examining two specific case studies of sovereignty disputes within the broader 
theme of an opening Arctic, this thesis attempts to solidify and reconcile the behavior of 
states in the Arctic.  Through the exploration of two case studies comparing the way 
states solve sovereignty disputes in the Arctic, this thesis should illuminate the patterns of 
interstate behavior that define Arctic interstate relations in ways that are more meaningful 
and measurable then simple state strategy documents can signal on their own. 
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III. THE BARENTS SEA DISPUTE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2010, Russian President Medvedev and Norwegian Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg announced that their governments had come to an agreement on the 
maritime delimitation boundary in the Barents Sea.  By March 2011, both countries had 
ratified the treaty ending a dispute over sovereign rights between the two Arctic 
neighbors that existed for half a century.  Can international relations theory explain this 
recent cooperation between Russia and Norway on the settlement of the long-standing 
boundary disputes in the Barents Sea?  This chapter will outline the background of the 
Barents Sea dispute between Norway and Russia, and describe the purported reasons for 
cooperation.  For the realist analysis it will attempt to describe the reasons for national 
interest in the Arctic, to compare relative power, and to outline any possible realist 
explanations for the dispute resolution.  To do this, it will analyze each country’s 
National strategy for the Arctic, and it will examine military activity in the Arctic by both 
Russia and Norway in order to highlight state behavior.  Realism predicts that states will 
use force projection and engage in security competition in situations where they seek to 
gain a power advantage.  If the threat of conflict was present prior to the resolution of the 
dispute, it may indicate the pursuit of realist behavior by the states.  
Neoliberal institutionalism predicts that international regimes and institutions are 
crucial in enhancing cooperation between states when the possibility of conflict exists.  
For this Chapter the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will be 
examined, as well as the Arctic Council.   
What were the role of institutions and regimes in the resolution of the dispute and 
why are they important?  For European politics the high north highlights three issues of 
interest.  First, many countries see the region’s alleged resource riches as a future source 
of energy for the continent, a future that is less reliant on Russian sources.  Therefore, 
energy security in Europe will likely include Arctic issues for the foreseeable future.  
Second, the location of the dispute has geographical importance for Europe.  Any 
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potential conflict in the Arctic has immediate repercussions for European neighborhood 
security.  Not only has the EU formulated Arctic strategy documents, countries as far 
south as Poland have expressed increasing interest in the security of the high north.  
Understanding the reasons and mechanisms behind Russia and Norway’s recent conflict 
resolution can allay fears over Arctic conflict in general, and help Europeans understand 
Russian intentions in particular.  Finally, understanding how rapid changes to the climate 
and to the geopolitical situation contribute to either conflict or cooperation in this case 
study is paramount.  This example is a benchmark for other Arctic issues that will emerge 
in the near future and is a critical test case for international relations theories in the 
Arctic.  While neither Norway nor Russia are member states in the EU, their actions in 
the Arctic have profound impacts on the EU and politics in Europe. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Since 1974, former Cold War foes Russia and Norway had disputed a maritime 
boundary between their sovereign claims in the Barents Sea.  This area of 175,000 square 
kilometers is believed to hold rich undersea deposits of petroleum and was a source of 
ongoing negotiations between Norway and Moscow until 15 September 2010, when 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg 
announced that an agreement had been made on the boundary.75  This agreement was 
ratified by parliaments in both countries by early 2011.  Just as rhetoric about geopolitical 
conflict in the Arctic was heating up following a U.S. Geologic Service (USGS) survey 
detailing rich resource predictions in the Arctic in 2006 and the Russian flag plant on the 
seabed of the North Pole in 2007, the cooperation trumpets were being sounded.7677  
Even more surprising was that analysis Russia had seemingly settled for an agreement 
that evenly divided the disputed area despite its clear power advantage in the region.   
                                                 
75 Regjeringen Norway, “Joint Statement on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents 
Sea and the Arctic Ocean,” (June 2010), www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/news/2010/statement 
delimitation.html?id=601983. 
76 U.S. Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic,” July 23, 2008, 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home. 
77 Reuters, “Russia plants flag on Arctic floor,” August 04, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/02/arctic.sub.reut/index.html. 
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In security studies of the Arctic so far, little attempt has been made to analyze this 
case through the lens of international relations theories.  At face value this case seems to 
present a model of IR cooperation for several reasons.  First, the two states are 
longstanding strategic competitors that were polarized during the Cold War as enemies.  
Second, this dispute, as noted above, has been unresolved for decades.  Third, the timing 
of the Barents’ treaty agreement coincides with a recent realization that the region has 
significant resource potential and coincides with a warming trend in the Arctic that has 
encouraged human activity.  Finally, all of this was allegedly done without overt power 
politics or the threat of conflict through bilateral cooperation guided by international law.   
 
 
Figure 1. Barents Sea Disputed Area with Norwegian Resource Development Areas (From 
Reuters, 2011).  
 
C. THE ARCTIC STAKES 
What is at stake for Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea?  According to the 
widely cited USGS Survey, the Arctic could hold up to 13% of the world’s undiscovered 
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oil, 30% of the undiscovered natural gas, and 20% of undiscovered natural gas liquids.78  
The prospects of rich hydrocarbon resources are compelling motivators for both Norway 
and Russia given their resource export based economies.  An ice-free Arctic would 
increase Russia’s ability to exploit precious and base metals in the High North and 
Siberia as well.  This region is “particularly rich in strategically important nonferrous and 
precious metals, hosting large high grade copper, zinc, diamonds, tin, gold, silver and 
nickel deposits.”79  As climate change creates ice-free Arctic summers the danger of 
multi-year ice, which is the most significant barrier to shipping, will disappear.  Improved 
access and a nascent shipping industry will open the region to resource and economic 
development on a scale that has been previously impossible.  
Fisheries also represent a strategic resource in the Arctic.  “Cod in the Barents Sea 
and Pollock in the Russian Far East of the Arctic represent roughly 25% of the global 
catch of whitefish.”80  These resource prospects combined with the possibility of 
improved shipping economies indicate that the importance of the Arctic to both Norway 
and Russia is difficult to overestimate.  Norway’s economy is primarily driven by natural 
resources recovered from the sea floor, while, “as much as 20 percent of Russia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) and 22 percent of the total Russian export is generated north of 
the Arctic Circle.”81  As current supplies dwindle, Russia will increasingly look to the 
Arctic for resource development. 
The northern sea route could dramatically reduce shipping distances from Europe 
to Asia, and could reduce the distance between the United States and Asia by as much as 
5,000 miles.82  These are clear economic incentives, but the increase in traffic through 
the Northern Sea Route would also present security challenges for Russia and Norway.  
“For the last few years, the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s north coast has seen ice 
changes, providing Russia with greater access to its vast Siberian resources and leading to 
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bold assertions of its sovereignty over vast swathes of the polar sea.” 83  All of these 
issues raised the stakes significantly for both countries in the 21st century; climate 
change was merely the trigger. 
D. ARCTIC STRUCTURE AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 
The first task in this analysis is to understand the power structure of the Arctic 
region.  This section will test the hypothesis that Russia is seeking to become an Arctic 
hegemon.  As noted in Chapter I, Mearsheimer’s version of neorealism predicts that all 
great powers strive to gain power over rivals, with the ultimate goal of hegemony, in 
what he calls offensive realism.84  However, Mearsheimer, accepts that global hegemony 
is “nearly impossible” for even the strongest states.85 This is crucial for understanding 
Russia’s role in the Arctic region, while the United States is currently the strongest state 
in the system it cannot dominate the global system.   Due to the U.S. role in the structure 
of the region it compels other Arctic states to increase their power in order to secure their 
position in the region. 
As noted in Chapter I, Mearsheimer divides power into latent and military 
power.86   The balance of power between Russia and Norway drastically favors Russia 
when calculated in both of these terms.  Although they are treated separately they are 
interconnected.  Russia’s military expenditures are directly correlated to the strength of 
their “latent” power base, which fuels the resource-based economy.  First, as a military 
power the comparison is terribly lopsided in terms of sheer numbers.  The Russian 
Federation boasts 645,000 combat forces currently.  They are in the process of reforming 
and modernizing their military and by 2012 they will still have one million people in the 
military (including support units).87  Norway’s military has already undergone significant 
modernization it has also reduced military manning levels drastically since the 1990s, 
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with current strength at 11,500.88  In the simple quantitative calculation of power favored 
by neorealists, the power structure is clear.  Russia is a great power in the Arctic, and 
Norway is not.  
Although realism places an emphasis on land armies as a measure of military 
power, the Arctic is a maritime environment that requires robust naval capabilities.  From 
a naval perspective, the backbone of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal is the Ballistic 
Missile Submarine (SSBN) assets assigned to the Northern Fleet.  “Despite the dramatic 
decline in the Northern Fleet since the end of the Cold War, Moscow continues to regard 
Murmansk, the Barents Sea and adjacent Arctic waters as vital to the defense of Russia 
and the exercise of the nuclear deterrent.”89  What about the rest of the Northern Fleet?  
Michael Roi summarizes the Russian naval situation as follows: 
While the possession of nuclear submarines imparts status to Russia— that 
is to say, they have a symbolic importance as indicators of great power 
standing—Moscow is determined to maintain the existing fleet of ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBNs), introduce new submarines and ballistic 
missiles, exercise them and deploy them in the Arctic Ocean because they 
perform the core defense mission of defending the homeland. Similarly, 
the Russians continue to retain their long-range strategic bombing fleets, 
consisting of the TU-160 Supersonic (Blackjack), an all-weather aircraft 
with an operational range of 12,000 km without refueling, the TU-95MS 
(Bear), a turboprop inter- continental bomber developed in the 1950s, and 
the TU-22M3 (Backfire C) with a shorter range compared to the other two 
aircraft. 
While the SSBN’s are part of Russia’s great power legacy, they are not a 
component of traditional maritime power.  Instead, the deterrence mission and cost of 
maintaining them draws resources away from traditional naval responsibilities.  While 
there has been a wide variety of plans and speeches concerning Russian military reform 
in general and for the Navy in particular, execution of the planned reforms has been 
difficult.  On April 20, Prime Minister Putin speaking to the Duma announced plans to 
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spend 5 trillion rubles to “restore and expand” the Russian Navy.90  However, analysis by 
Roger McDermott at The Jamestown Foundation casts strong doubt on the reality of 
achieving massive naval reforms in Russia: “The extent of naval manning problems, 
weaknesses in the entire reform and lack of conceptual clarity on precisely what the naval 
modernization should entail all suggests that Putin’s political statements concerning the 
Navy’s future must be regarded cautiously.”91  While Russia certainly aspires to 
modernize and reorganize its forces, it faces significant challenges.  Despite all this, 
compared to the modest size of the Norwegian forces, the Russians still maintain a 
massive power advantage in traditional realist calculations 
The imbalance between the two countries is not surprising and is one of the 
reasons Norway was compelled to be one of the founding members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization alliance (NATO).  In fact, the Norwegian Deputy Minister of 
Defence, Espen Eide, called for increased role for the alliance in the high north at a 
NATO parliamentary Assembly in 2009.92  Unfortunately, the new NATO strategic 
concept did not emphasize security in the High North and no further movement was made 
on the subject.  Additionally, internal Alliance objections by Canada about NATO getting 
involved in the Arctic and external objections by Russia to an increased NATO role in 
the Arctic both dampened any possibility of the alliance placing a strategic priority on 
Arctic security.93  With the Alliance placing low interest in the region’s security Norway 
was seemingly left to deal bilaterally with the Russian bear. 
This leads to a clear conclusion that Russia is dominating the structure of the 
Arctic and that Norway emerges as a significantly weaker power in comparison. 
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However, for realism to appropriately describe the geopolitical situation this test must 
analyze not just the power structure of the Arctic, but the goals and priorities of the two 
states. 
E. REALISM AND NATIONAL GOALS 
As discussed in Chapter I, realism predicts that military security will dominate the 
hierarchy of state goals and that states seek to increase their power through material and 
latent economic resources.  In this view, Russia and Norway should emphasize 
acquisition and military defense of key resources in the Arctic. Their national interests in 
the region should be to increase their material and latent economic power in order to 
pursue security in the self-help system of international relations, and, ultimately, to seek 
regional hegemony.   
1. Norway 
The Norwegian government issued its first “High North Strategy” in 2006 and 
then updated it in 2009.  The objectives and policy priorities were to “exercise authority,” 
to be a good “steward” while developing the Arctic, which includes safeguarding the 
environment and indigenous populations, and finally to be a leader in international affairs 
of the region while strengthening cooperation with Russia.94  Since Norway relies on oil 
and petroleum as a primary source of national income, Oslo’s interest in Arctic resource 
development is high.95   Arctic gas and oil has been the cornerstone of the Norwegian 
economy with the petroleum sector accounting for half of its exports.96  Additionally, 
Norway is the second largest exporter of natural gas while oil exports have fallen to ninth 
worldwide due to declining production.97  Norway has also relied on oil profits from the 
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North Sea to fuel economic development since the 1970’s with its semi-nationalized 
Statoil Company.  However, “the decline of both North and the Norwegian seas as oil-
producing provinces is a problem.  Having risen from nothing at all in 1970 to 528,000 
barrels per day (bpd) in 1980, to 1.7 million bpd in 1990 and 3.3 million bpd in 2000, oil 
production peaked in 2001.  By 2007, production had fallen to 2.6 million bpd.”98  This 
alone could explain why Norway sought to settle disputes in the Barents Sea with Russia, 
as it must look further north to secure its economic future as a hydrocarbon resource 
exporter.   
Analyzing the power structure of the region reveals that Norway is significantly 
less powerful than Russia, however the Norwegian national goals outline engagement and 
cooperation rather than security competition.  One confounding factor not addressed here 
is the role of NATO, which provides a large U.S. security umbrella to Norway.  While 
U.S. power is a significant factor, ultimately realism requires states to seek maximum 
self-sustainment in security.  In this case the national goals of Norway do not reflect that. 
2. Russia 
Russian approaches to the Arctic were described in Chapter 1 as a strategic 
resource base and a securitized region that has been given a recent lift in policy 
importance.  Realism accurately predicts the Russian national goals for the Arctic in that 
it places the highest priority on security in the region and that it seeks to maximize its 
sovereignty in the region because of the natural resources and economic benefits of 
increased shipping. However, it does a poor job in predicting Norway’s national goals of 
engagement and cooperation with Russia.  However, what states profess in their official 
strategies and what they actually do are not always the same.  It is state behavior that 
really demonstrates the geopolitical relationships. 
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F. REALISM AND STATE BEHAVIOR 
Is there evidence of security competition between Norway and Russia?  Has either 
state acted aggressively to gain a stronger position prior to the negotiation of the Barents 
Treaty? All of these questions attempt to characterize the behavior of each state in a way 
that correlates with neorealism.   
In 2007, after a 15-year suspension, Russia resumed its long-range bomber patrols 
over the North Pole.  Putin remarked that “flights by other countries’ strategic aircraft 
continue and this creates certain problems for ensuring the security of the Russian 
Federation.”99  This classic case of security competition followed a familiar path when 
two of the Russian Tupolev 95 aircraft “strayed south from their normal patrol pattern off 
the Norwegian coast and headed towards Scotland.  Two RAG Tornado fighters were 
sent up to meet them.”100  In predictable fashion the Norwegians began a major refocus 
of their military structure toward the Arctic by placing two F-16 fighters on permanent 
fifteen-minute standby at Bodo airbase as well as moving its national command center to 
Reitan in the Arctic.101  Additionally, Norway expanded its naval capabilities with the 
purchase of five new frigate sized surface combatants.102  Meanwhile Russia has 
dramatically increased military spending in the 21st century, quadrupling between 2001 
and 2007, and then reaching a post-soviet high in 2009 of 15%–16% of the total federal 
budget expenditure.103 
This summary points to a clear security competition situation and documents 
some degree of aggressive behavior on Russia’s part in the time period directly preceding 
the Treaty agreement. When combined with the stated national interests in the Arctic this 
behavior makes a strong case for neorealism’s ability to accurately portray the 
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geopolitical interplay between Norway and Russia in the Arctic.  However, in terms of 
cooperation on the Barents Treaty neorealism is still problematic.  Although neorealism 
accurately predicts security competition based on the power structure and resources at 
stake in the Arctic, it would also predict that any dispute would be solved by military 
power or at the least settled in favor of the greater power.  It rarely allows for a 
cooperative settlement between a great power and a minor power, unless the great 
power’s relative gains exceed those of the smaller power or that smaller power makes 
large concessions to appease the greater power.   
G. NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
This chapter has demonstrated that neorealism can account for much of the 
behavior between Russia and Norway concerning the Arctic sovereignty dispute over the 
Barents Sea border.  However, both states constrained their use of power and worked 
within the framework of international law to agree on a treaty to resolve the dispute 
rather than resorting to force.  This section of the thesis will analyze the Barents Treaty 
negotiation in terms of Robert Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism framework in order 
to understand how the cooperation emerged and prove that it is the more accurate 
international relations theory for this case study.  
In this case study international regimes should shape how Norway and Russia 
presented their arguments and ultimately assist in resolving their dispute.   
H. ARCTIC INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
1. The Law of the Sea 
Since the Arctic region in general, and the Barents Sea in particular, are maritime 
domains the primary international regime that states utilize is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.  This treaty codified and consolidated a large amount 
of customary law into an organized framework that promotes general cooperation and 
provides explicit rules for resource claims and rights in territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones.  Further bolstering the primacy of the UNCLOS in the Arctic, all five of 
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the Arctic littoral states affirmed their commitment to the Law of the Sea and the orderly 
settlement of sovereignty and claims disputes with the signing of the Ilulissat 
Declaration.104 Thus, international ocean law under the 1982 treaty sets the rules for how 
oceans and the natural resources within them are managed.   
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea makes provisions for various types of 
sovereignty claims in the maritime domain.  “The exclusive economic zone or EEZ is 
covered by Articles 56, 58 and 59.  The EEZ is defined as that portion of the seas and 
oceans extending up to 200 nautical miles in which coastal states have the right to 
explore and exploit natural resources as well as to exercise jurisdiction over marine 
science research and environmental protection.”105  When states’ 200 nautical mile 
claims overlap and a dispute arises, according to article 59, the conflict “should be 
resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.”106 
In the Barents Sea, the boundary between Russia’s territory Franz Josef’s land 
and Norway’s territory of Svalbard do not allow either state the full 200nm exclusive 
economic zones afforded by the Law of the Sea.  Additionally, the land border between 
Norway and Russia projected seaward becomes problematic in the Barents Sea as it 
approaches the delimitation barrier between the Russian and Norwegian island territories 
mentioned above.  According to the 1982 Convention, “coastal states can agree on how 
their maritime delimitation disputes should be resolved.”107  The fact that they chose to 
work within the 1982 convention bolsters the neoliberal institutionalism view that 
international regimes are used to bargain and ultimately create cooperative patterns of 
international relations even when states pursue self-interest and have competing claims.  
This is a crucial example of what Keohane describes in his theory. 
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2. The Arctic Council as an International Institution 
As the primary international institution for Arctic cooperation, according to 
neoliberal institutional theory, The Arctic Council should have played a primary role in 
resolving the Barents Sea dispute.  Theory predicts that these institutions provide 
information and allow states to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements.  In this case the 
Arctic Council was not utilized to resolve the long-standing dispute in part because it did 
not exist until 1996.  The negotiations were conducted bilaterally over a long period, but 
observers trace the current progress to the election of Jens Stoltenberg as Prime Minister 
of Norway in 2005.108  However, this does not mean the Arctic Council did not play a 
role in the Barents Sea Treaty case.  One of the crucial problems of international 
cooperation is the issue of enforcement.  States can never be certain that other states will 
abide by international agreements.  The incentive to cheat is large.  The Arctic Council 
introduces a reciprocity to Arctic issues that dissuades cheating by ensuring a continual 
open dialogue between all Arctic stakeholders.  If a state chooses to cheat on one policy 
agreement, it would be known to all the other states via the Arctic Council and that state 
would have difficulty negotiating future agreements. 
The key indicator for neoliberal institutionalism in this case study is the evolving 
way that states argued their case with respect to the many changes in the international law 
of the sea.  This would fit the definition of international regimes that includes explicit sets 
of rules that guide actors in a given area of international relations.  Henriksen and 
Ulfstein demonstrate this in their overview of the Barents Sea dispute: 
The history of the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea dates back at 
least to the 1957 Varangerfjord Agreement, which established the 
boundary between the territorial seas of mainland Norway and the Soviet 
Union. Since then, the maritime boundary issue has followed the 
developments of the law of the sea. Following the adoption of the 1958 
UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, in 1963 Norway claimed 
sovereign rights to the seabed and the subsoil adjacent to its coasts.9 The 
Soviet Union made a similar claim in 1967.  Large parts of the seabed of 
the Barents Sea were seen as being continental shelf pursuant to the 1958 
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Convention and, thus, a need for bilateral delimitation between Norway 
and Soviet Union existed. Formal negotiations started in Moscow in 1974, 
following informal meetings held in 1970.11 In 1977, the negotiations 
became more extensive when both Norway and the Soviet Union 
established 200 mile EEZs in the area. In addition to the continental shelf 
boundary, now the two coastal states had to deal with overlapping EEZ 
claims.  The point of departure for the negotiations on the delimitation of 
the continental shelf was Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention to which both states were parties, which stipulated that the 
boundary is the median line unless another boundary is justified by 
“special circumstances.” Both states later became parties to the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea making its Articles 74 and 83 the 
applicable law.  Both parties argued that these new provisions upheld their 
reading of Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention.  The two parties 
agreed that the negotiating objective was to establish a single boundary for 
the EEZ and the continental shelf in areas within 200 miles from their 
relevant coastlines.109 
This historical overview of the dispute clearly demonstrates the effect that 
international law of the sea had on the two states’ cases.  Independent of changing power 
structures throughout the time period of the dispute, from the Soviet era to the Russian 
Federation, both states were at a stalemate on resolving the dispute.  However, both 
countries continually evolved their cases as international legal regimes for the law of the 
sea evolved.  The analysis of the role of international regimes reveals that the 1982 UN 
Law of the Sea framework played a significant role in the resolution of the Barents Sea 
dispute.   
I. CONCLUSION 
The Barents Sea Treaty between Russia and Norway has been hailed as a model 
for international cooperation in the Arctic region.  However, it is important to look past 
the end product of the treaty and understand how the cooperation emerged and what the 
key drivers were.   
From a realist perspective there is clear evidence of security as the primary 
national interest for the Russian government, and to a lesser extent Norway.  The power 
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structure indicates that Norway should seek to bolster its security in relation to its more 
powerful neighbor.  Russia has explicitly stated that the Arctic and its resources are 
critical to its national interest and that they cannot rule out the use of force.    
From the neoliberal institutionalism perspective there is much stronger agreement 
between what theory predicts and what occurred between Norway and Russia.  Although 
self-interest and pursuit of security interests were present, these do not rule out a 
neoliberal explanation emphasizing interest in states’ pursuit of joint gains.  Norway 
characterized its security needs in terms of engagement and cooperation with its large 
neighbor to allay any threats.  Additionally, its policy of engagement with Russia 
indicates that the Norwegian leadership believed that the Russian government would be 
open to bargaining in the region as they grew their resource economy in the early 21st 
century.  The key victory for neoliberal theory over neorealism hinges on the outcome of 
the agreement.  Neorealism is focused on relative gains at the expense of absolute gains.  
As the greater power, Russia should not have agreed to any resolution that did not 
provide higher relative gains in relation to Norway (Refer to Figure 1 which depicts the 
agreed-upon boundary, which shows a fairly equal division of the disputed sea area).  
“Based on the map, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent the line is an adjusted line 
based on the median line and the treaty provides little information on what principles 
were used to obtain the line. The April 2010 joint statement is more informative as the 
disputed area (between the median line and the sector line) is said to be divided in two 
parts of approximate the same size. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated this more 
explicitly: “about 88000 square kilometers for either parties.”110  In short, there was a 
highly equitable division of the disputed area.  This confirms that power had little to do 
with the agreement and that both parties were focused on absolute gains over relative 
gains. 
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Figure 2.  The Barents Sea Treaty Delimitation Line. 
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In this case study, the wide consensus in media and government rhetoric 
concerning the historic cooperation exemplified between Russia and Norway on the 
Barents Sea Treaty was accurate.  Keohane’s cooperative theory of international relations 
more accurately explains this critical case.  The only hope for neorealist vindication is in 
the detection of rule breaking by states after the creation of these cooperative 
frameworks, which would support their eternal pessimism about international regimes.  
Until then, they must accept the reality of interstate cooperation through international 
regimes.  
 46 
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IV. THE NORTH AMERICAN ARCTIC RELATIONSHIP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the broad focus is on patterns of international relations between 
Canada and the United States with the Northwest Passage dispute as a vehicle to explore 
the relationship between the two countries.  Instead of simply assessing the balance of 
cooperative and conflict-oriented behavior, I will apply neorealism and neoliberalism to 
the region and test how well they can describe the current relationship between the two 
North American countries.  Testing these theories across the dynamic backdrop of a 
changing Arctic geopolitical landscape may not offer any stronger predictive power than 
other attempts to characterize the region, but it should prove to be a worthwhile empirical 
test of the theories and their applicability in a changing region that has an uncertain 
future. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Although Canada and the United States have a long-standing alliance that can be 
described accurately by structural neorealism, ultimately it cannot properly predict the 
complete state of Arctic geopolitics between Canada and the United States.    Instead, 
some of the fundamental assumptions of neorealism that can be identified in this Arctic 
case-study are also valid in Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence framework; 
their neoliberal approach ultimately provides better descriptive power for the relationship 
between the two North American allies.   
The case study on the Northwest Passage dispute is important because it 
represents a significant unresolved dispute between two long-standing allies over a key 
issue that is common in Arctic geopolitics between several states.  If realist predictions 
are found to accurately describe this case, then there is cause for concern over the case of 
the Northern Sea Route, which involves Russia asserting an internal waters claim that is 
very similar to Canada’s Northwest Passage claims. 
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C. BACKGROUND 
1. The Northwest Passage  
To understand what an ice-free Northwest Passage would mean to the relationship 
between the United States and Canada, we must define the passage, and then briefly 
examine the history of the passage and the dispute over its legal definition.  Explorers 
have carried out the search for an ice-free passage through the Arctic, from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific Oceans, for at least five centuries.  The modern Northwest Passage is a 
combination of routes with the widest and deepest route running, “from Lancaster Sound 
through Barrow Straight into Viscount Melville Sound.”111  Once this region begins to 
experience ice-free summers, the lack of multi-year ice will allow it to be transited year 
round with ice-strengthened ships in convoys led by icebreakers.112  This eventuality will 
bring the dormant dispute between Canada and nearly every other state on the legal 
characterization of the route to the forefront.   
Canada has been confronted with the task of administering vast expanses of the 
high north since Britain ceded all of its remaining lands in North America in 1867.  
During World War II continental defense concerns elevated the Arctic region to an area 
of strategic concern and the Americans were willingly invited into the region to “fill a 
void created by inadequate Canadian resources to defend the North.”113  This generated a 
pattern of interstate relations between the countries where pragmatic American actions 
and policies sometimes trod upon Canadian sovereignty sensitivities.  From that initial 
cooperation on development of territorial defense, through the Cold War years, and on to 
the modern attempts to accommodate not just security interests, but also economic 
development, shipping, and environmental interests, the relationship between the 
neighbors has been one of extensive cooperation and occasional disputes. 
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The United States, along with the European Union and other states, assert that the 
Northwest Passage constitutes an international straight between two high seas.  This 
characterization would grant transit passage through the route to any ship without 
requiring permission as well as permit submarines to pass through without surfacing.  
Canada claims that the passage is an inland waterway and that it is sovereign territory 
under its control and jurisdiction.114  Despite Canadian claims, the United States has 
asserted its freedom of navigation stance several times in the post-war period by sending 
ships through the passage.  
The Exxon supertanker Manhattan, escorted by Coast Guard icebreaker 
Northwind, attempted a transit in 1969.  In response to this challenge Canada enacted the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Act in 1970, “which imposed strict safety and environmental 
requirements on all shipping within 100 nautical miles of Canada’s Arctic coast.”115  
This law essentially required Canadian certification of oil spill prevention standards and 
amounted to a de facto attempt to require permission for passage. 
The United States raised the issue again in 1985 when the Coast Guard icebreaker 
Polar Sea transited the passage enroute from Greenland to its homeport in Seattle.  The 
U.S. government explicitly stated that it would be exercising freedom of navigation rights 
and that permission was neither sought nor necessary.116  The Canadians responded 
pragmatically by offering their permission and practical assistance, but disagreeing on the 
legal interpretation claimed by the Americans.  As with most issues of Ocean Law, 
customary use often carries substantial weight in deciding legality.  By continuing to 
pursue the usage of the Northwest Passage the United States was maintaining an 
important precedent.  
Ultimately, the incident brought another evolution in the dispute that attempted to 
resolve the issue, at least pragmatically if not legally.  In January 1988 President Reagan 
and Prime Minister Mulroney signed the Executive Agreement on Arctic Cooperation.  
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The agreement promised that U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers would apply for Canadian 
permission to transit the Northwest Passage.117 The United States did not concede that 
the passage constituted Canada’s internal waters, but the dispute went dormant again and 
remains unresolved.  In 2009 President Bush signed NSPD-66 The Arctic Policy 
Directive.  In it the Northwest Passage is addressed explicitly in this section: 
Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a 
strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route 
includes straits used for international navigation; the regime of transit 
passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving the rights and 
duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports 
our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through 
strategic straits.118 
The relationship between Canada and the United States has evolved substantially 
over the years, yet this dispute remains unresolved.  As the Arctic environment changes 
and both countries look Northward to expand their presence in the region, will the 
Northwest Passage dispute be resolved? 
D. NEOREALISM  
This portion of the thesis will analyze the relationship between Canada and the 
United States through the lens of structural realism.  Mearsheimer provides the primary 
theoretical backbone of this analysis with his clear structural realist assumptions, while 
Walt supplements these elements with his focus on alliances.  The analysis is constructed 
as follows:  First, it will examine the power structure in the Arctic region and discuss 
Russia’s influence on North American Arctic relations.  Second, it will attempt to 
illuminate the goals of the two Arctic allies and their respective hierarchies of national 
interest in the region.  Third, it will trace state military activity in order to determine if 
securitization of the Arctic is occurring.  Finally, it will test Stephen M. Walt’s theory on 
alliance formation and test conditions for evidence of balancing behavior between the 
North American Arctic states and Russia. 
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1. Structure 
Since both neorealist theories in this test are structural theories, the first step is to 
establish the structure of the Arctic.  Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, The 
United States, and Russia are the five littoral Arctic states.  This section will test the 
hypothesis that the United States and Russia are the dominant powers in the Arctic region 
and that Canada was compelled to ally with the United States.  Mearsheimer’s version of 
neorealism predicts that all great powers strive to gain power over rivals, therefore we 
should expect both states to seek greater sources of power in the Arctic.119   
While both countries are nuclear capable, the Unites States has double the 
population, double the available military manpower, three times the number of active 
naval units, and a larger overall active military force.120  Beyond sheer numbers, the 
Russian military is only now beginning to modernize its long decaying forces.  
Structurally these two great powers dwarf Canada in terms of population and military 
size, with Canada only registering a tenth of the U.S. population size, and a paltry 62,000 
active duty military personnel compared to the United States at 1.4 million.  In latent 
power terms, the power structure is identical with the United States emerging as the 
greatest power and Russia still much stronger than the remaining states.  Canada is strong 
economically relative to its population.   
In an opening Arctic several latent power considerations come into play.  Canada 
and other Arctic nations have to consider the impacts on sovereignty disputes (and their 
subsequent impact on EEZs), natural resource development, shipping, and fisheries.  
According to neorealism, an ice-free Arctic can bring states into competition for these 
sources of power.  The opening round of Arctic competition came with Russia’s flag 
planting on the seabed of the North Pole; this was done largely to bring attention to 
“Russia’s claim to a vast extension of its continental shelf extending from Russia’s 
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northern shores to the North Pole along the Lomonosov Ridge.”121  Under the Law of the 
Sea Convention, states can extend their 200-mile exclusive economic zones if they can 
prove that their continental shelves extend beyond the standard limits.  These claims are 
the prelude to establishing legitimate control over the Arctic’s resources.    
How does this lead to competition?  This summer the Russian ship Akademik 
Fyodorov, escorted by a Russian nuclear icebreaker, conducted undersea mapping to 
bolster its claims to Siberian continental shelf extensions.122  Each Arctic state is anxious 
to extend their claims in the region, but all five have formally agreed to resolve disputes 
peacefully through the Ilulissat Declaration.  Russia is expected to submit its claim to 
380,000 square miles of the Arctic this year.123 
These claims are important because they determine economic rights to Arctic 
resources.  Hydrocarbons are a prime motivator with the estimates mentioned in previous 
Chapters as well as the rising demand for hydrocarbons by India and China.124  
Fish stocks are also a source of competition between states worldwide, even those 
with a long history of cooperation such as France and Spain struggle with the 
fundamental common action problem that they present.  For the Arctic, Canada and the 
United States have sought comprehensive development approaches that consider impacts 
to the ecosystem as a whole.  This approach creates a significant common action problem 
if Russia does not pursue a responsible fisheries approach in the Arctic.   Competition 
from commercial fishing is fierce in all the world’s oceans and a freshly thawed Arctic 
offers significant new opportunities.  Canada and the United States already cooperate in 
several regional fisheries management organizations, including the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization, and the bilateral international Pacific Halibut Commission 
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(IPHC).125  Given the transboundary nature of Arctic fish stocks, without international 
cooperation on regulation, disputes between the Arctic states over valuable fish stocks are 
predicted by neorealist theory.   
Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) reported the value of 
commercial sea fisheries at $1.64 billion dollars for 2009.126  In 2010, the DFO reported 
total fish and seafood exports valued at $3.9 billion in 2010, with a five-year average of 
$2.2 billion.127  In comparison, the U.S. commercial fisheries trade and production value 
was slightly higher at $4.5 billion USD in 2008, and the Russian Federation value lower 
at $2.6 billion USD.128  However, in terms of quantity, the Russians production quantity 
dwarfed the Canadians at over 5 million tons, compared to Canada’s 1 million tons, while 
the U.S. totaled 3.7 million tons.  This means that Russia’s production value lags behind 
Canada’s, while the size of the Russian catch is five times as large.  Based on this data 
and the geographic realities of Arctic fishery competition between Russia and Canada, an 
opening Arctic should bring the two states into competition over fish stocks. 
Just as the Panama Canal radically changed the shipping world, the opening of 
circumpolar Arctic sea routes will completely alter the seaborne shipping industry.  For 
Canada this will place intense international pressure on its claims over the Northwest 
Passage.  The rest of the world may present a unified challenge to Canada’s designation 
of the Northwest Passage as internal waters.   
Location also plays a crucial role in examining the structure of a region.  In this 
case Canada can be seen as an obvious territorial ally for the United States, but it can also 
be seen as a security buffer between two nuclear capable great powers.  Although realism 
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places an emphasis on land armies, the Arctic is a maritime environment.  Russia’s 
northern fleet is home to its nuclear ballistic missile submarines and by extension its 
strategic nuclear capability.  This is where Walt’s balance of threat approach sheds 
needed light on the power structure.  Walt defines threat as a product of aggregate power, 
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and the aggressiveness of its intentions.129  
The key element is the perception of threat characterized by Walt as aggressive 
intentions.  This element is crucial because threat perception is a powerful determinant in 
predicting the formation of Alliances among states.  The threat in this structure comes 
from Russia.  “Despite the dramatic decline in the Northern Fleet since the end of the 
Cold War, Moscow continues to regard Murmansk, the Barents Sea and adjacent Arctic 
waters as vital to the defense of Russia and the exercise of the nuclear deterrent.”130  
 Meanwhile the United States maintains a robust SSBN component in its strategic 
triad of nuclear deterrence, while Canada has relied on the United States for its nuclear 
defense umbrella.  It is clear from a basic military power and threat perspective that in the 
Arctic power structure Canada was a prime candidate for alliance formation.  According 
to Walt, Russia’s geographic domination of the Arctic and approaches to the use of force 
in other recent disputes like Georgia continue to reinforce longstanding threat perceptions 
across the Atlantic. These drivers are precisely what led Canada to join the formal North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance in 1949, and they also serve as a barrier to a 
bandwagon alliance with Russia.  The influence of Russia continues to be a dominant 
factor in the North American arctic relationship, one which will be discussed further in 
the alliance portion of this Chapter.  
2. National Strategy and Goals 
Neorealism is clear on national interests and the hierarchy of national goals; 
military security has primacy.  In an anarchical world states are responsible for their own 
security and defense and seek to increase their security by amassing power through 
material and economic resources. In the case of the Arctic, if realism is accurate we 
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should expect military security to maintain primacy in the national strategies over time 
and that their interests in the Arctic, beyond security, are focused on resources to increase 
national power.  For this portion we will simply compare the Arctic strategies of Canada 
and the United States, saving analysis of state behavior for the next section.   
The United States released its most recent national strategy approach to the Arctic 
in January 2009.  The Arctic Region Policy, or National Security Presidential Directive 
66, outlined the national interest and priorities for the Arctic.  The first goal of the policy 
was defense of the homeland, with the prevention and mitigation of hostile attacks noted 
along with the now familiar focus on the threat of terrorism.131  Although other policy 
objectives are outlined, the primacy of national security interests in the Arctic policy as 
highlighted in NSPD 66 is unequivocal.   
Canada’s official northern strategy was released in July 2009 and in some respects 
can be viewed as a response to the U.S. policy document.  The Canadian’s Arctic strategy 
crafts a narrative in which they are a northern nation and that the region’s future lay 
within “a strong and sovereign Canada.”132  In fact, strengthening sovereignty claims in 
the Arctic is a top priority of the Canadian strategy, which involves “firmly asserting its 
presence in the North, ensuring we have the capability and capacity to protect and patrol 
the land, sea, and sky in our sovereign Arctic territory.”133  Since 2007 Ottawa has 
announced significant procurement plans that support Canada’s assertion of sovereign 
control of over its Arctic territory.  The size of its forces are modest in comparison to the 
United States, but its narrow focus and recently renewed commitment to the region 
indicate that it intends to exercise full joint force capability in the Arctic.  The official 
government approaches outlined in both cases coincides with realist predictions about 
national priorities, but do the states actions reflect the official words? 
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3. State Behavior 
If the story of the Polar Sea transit serves as a symbol of American insouciance 
over Canadian sovereignty claims, then it also serves as a symbol of American 
ambivalence toward Arctic security competition.  As one of three U.S. icebreakers, and 
the only operational heavy icebreaker, it is already beyond service life expectations and 
recently suffered a major engine failure last year, which left the United States with zero 
heavy icebreaking capabilities.134  The policy set forth by NSPD 66 is only now starting 
to drive the dialogue around Arctic icebreaking capability development.  As it stands the 
United States lags behind nearly every other Arctic country in developing maritime assets 
and operational capability for the region, at least in the surface maritime domain.  
Under the ice the United States has long maintained an Arctic capability.  In 1958 
the USS Nautilus crossed the Arctic Ocean and began a Cold War pattern of operations 
that continues today with the recent polar surfacing of the Virginia class attack submarine 
Texas.135  This capability was crucial during the Cold War years as the North American 
Arctic represented an exposed flank for Soviet nuclear attack.  However, with the end of 
the Cold War these military aspects were less important.   If the assumptions of rapid 
climate change and national interest in the Arctic hold, then one would expect that as the 
ice gives way to an ocean, so shall the submarine operations be replaced by surface and 
air assets to conduct regular maritime operations.  So far this has not occurred on the U.S. 
side, although the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap suggests that they are pursuing the goal of 
increased maritime capability in the region.136 
Canada’s overall military forces are dwarfed by the size of the U.S. military, but 
in the Arctic they have a head start on operational capabilities in the maritime 
environment. Six operational icebreakers are in service at present.137  They have 
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maintained a modest capability over the years, in part because monitoring and controlling 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is crucial to its sovereign claims.  Canada is continuing 
to develop operational capability in the Arctic in multiple ways: through the launching of 
reconnaissance satellites, building of infrastructure, procurement of more icebreakers, 
and the procurement and development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).138  Yet 
despite these actions, neither country has sought to defend against the other or engage in 
security competition.  In fact, due to their long-term alliances, the possibility of military 
conflict between the two states is remote. 
Since World War II, Canada has relied on two military alliances with the United 
States for conventional territorial defense.  NATO and NORAD have provided extensive 
military cooperation and mutual defense guarantees to both states. According to Waltz, 
“structural theory assumes the dominant goal of states is security, since to pursue 
whatever other goals they may have, they must first survive.”139  Since the possibility of 
military conflict is highly unlikely, it is crucial to apply neorealist frameworks for 
alliances to the relationship. 
4. Alliances 
Canada’s aggregate power, as explored so far, is unquestionably inferior to 
modern Russia.  Given the structural imbalance in the Arctic and the geographic 
proximity of the United States, Canada has a clear motive for seeking an alliance.  In 
Walt’s terms, the North American Arctic relationship can be viewed as a balancing 
alliance against Russia.  The United States Canada alliance was clearly meant to balance 
against the Soviet Union, but other members of NATO also joined the United States in 
this endeavor.  In order for this conclusion to hold true, Russia must not only pose a 
threat due to its aggregate power, but also because of its threatening intentions. 
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Chapter II already discussed the importance of the Arctic to Russia as a strategic resource 
base, therefore this section will focus on recent Russian actions in the Arctic that support 
a threat perception.   
Beyond Russian strategy and rhetoric lies some concerning behavior for Alliance 
members looking north to an opening Arctic.  First, the resumption of long range TU-95 
Russian strategic nuclear bomber patrols has raised concern over the past year, 
particularly when these bombers penetrated European airspace four times with out 
permission so far in 2011.140 So far, this is the limited scope of threatening military 
behavior in the Arctic.  However, Officials at the Russian Ministry of Defense have 
announced plans to establish a special forces (Spetsnaz) unit in the Arctic as well as 
reorganizing military districts to create an Arctic district.141  In addition to strictly 
military actions, Russia has planned to develop infrastructure in the Arctic to support 
increased commercial activities.  Current plans call for nine emergency response centers 
along the northern sea route as well as an increase in permanent weather observation 
stations and automated reporting stations in the Arctic.142  This analysis supports 
Canada’s threat perception in the post-Cold War Arctic and its motives to continue an 
alliance with the United States. 
E. NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND COMPLEX 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
This portion of the thesis will test the relationship between Canada and the United 
States against these assumptions in order to see if the theory of complex interdependence 
is more accurate than traditional structural realism. 
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Before proceeding to an exploration of the three basic assumptions of complex 
interdependence, it is crucial to define interdependence and approximate the North 
American relationship according to that definition.  As noted in Chapter one, the basic 
definition of interdependence is mutual dependence that is costly to break, however it is 
important to understand the concept of costly effects when analyzing interdependence.  
For example, Canada is the single largest supplier of oil to the United States at 20% of 
total imports.143   Canada could protest U.S. policy by cutting off the supply of oil, which 
would have a significant impact on the U.S. economy in both the short term and long 
term.  However, this would have costly effects on Canada because the United States is 
such a large consumer of Canadian oil.  Not only would it have immediate market effects, 
any long-term denial would necessitate significant reorganization of the oil export 
infrastructure.  “Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly 
effects of transactions, there is interdependence.”144  Indeed, Canada-U.S. bilateral 
relations are among the most closely connected in terms of mutual dependence in the 
world.  The relationship is so unique that it largely defies realist theories about state 
cooperation.  Karl Deutsch called this relationship a “security community,” and theorized 
that through long integration leads to a sense of community, which produces a stable 
peace.145 
A simple examination of the staggering trade flow between the two states reveals 
the extent of the relationship.  63% of Canada’s imports come from the United States, 
while 75% of Canada’s exports go to the United States146 The North American Free 
Trade Agreement was designed to liberalize trade between the two countries in 1994.  
Today over $1.6 billion in goods cross the border everyday, along with 300,000 people, 
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but the relationship spans many areas beyond trade. There are extensive security and 
defense interactions and cooperation as another primary area of interdependence.   
2. Multiple Channels 
In order to narrow the scope of the analysis this thesis will only highlight multiple 
channels of communication that have relative importance for the Northwest Passage 
issue.  For security and defense the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) 
alliance has been a primary channel of coordination between the two countries since 
1958.  In 2006 the NORAD agreement was updated to include joint maritime surveillance 
over the North and by extension surveillance of the Northwest Passage.147  It would be 
exceedingly difficult to assemble a complete list of federal agency contact between the 
two countries, however an older study put the numbers at 31 American federal agencies 
and 21 Canadian counterparts back in 1965!148  The most significant interstate interaction 
in the Arctic has been the joint mapping of the sea floor.  Two rounds of cooperative 
surveying in the Beaufort Sea have been conducted in order to delineate the outer limits 
of the Canadian continental shelf beyond 200nm.  This is crucial because Canada has 
until 2013 to submit its claims to an extended shelf under UNCLOS.149  
In the post 9/11 world of enhanced security and police cooperation the number of 
contacts between the Washington and Ottawa are likely significantly higher.  Beyond 
state-to-state relations, the North American allies are members of multiple institutions: 
The United Nations, NATO, NORAD, NAFTA, Arctic Council, G8, and the G20.   These 
institutions offer a complex web of overlapping agendas and contacts between the two 
countries as well.  This complex U.S.-Canada relationship is so unique that IR theorists 
following Karl Deutsch have developed new theories concerning security communities to 
describe the relationship.  Sean Shore argues that the large undefended border between 
the North American allies since the Civil War has contributed to the enduring trust and 
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refuted realist claims that states that are not secure will be systematically punished.150  
These political security communities mature over time and are in line with the 
expectations of Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence. 
Transnational linkages where the state is not the central point of interaction also 
abound. For the Arctic, developing infrastructure to support shipping in the Northwest 
Passage is a key issue in the economic development of the region, as well as a security 
concern.  The Canadian port of Churchill is one of the key terminals for future trans-
arctic trade and is owned by Omnitrax Inc, a Denver based Multi-national 
Corporation.151  Additionally, a former Canadian foreign minister is running the 
Churchill development corporation in charge of port expansion.  This transnational 
example highlights further evidence of the complex set of connections between the 
United States and Canada in the Arctic. 
3. Agenda Hierarchy 
With the plethora of contact channels between the countries, it is exceedingly 
difficult to infer a hierarchy of issues on the Arctic. Is the focus on security, shipping, 
environment, economic development, or preparedness?  While territorial defense may 
have been the primary agenda item during the Cold War, following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the deeply interconnected U.S. relationship with Canada lost the clear-cut 
hierarchy provided by the fear of Soviet nuclear attack.  While defense and security are 
taken seriously and the two states maintain the same Cold War alliances, few would 
likely argue that security is still the top agenda item. 
A recent joint statement issued by Prime Minister Harper of Canada and President 
Obama created a joint regulatory cooperation council to facilitate trade and 
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investment.152  For the Arctic, both countries have adopted an ecosystem-based approach 
that considers system wide impacts to the Arctic.  “Both countries share common 
ecosystem objectives for the Arctic region: prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery.”153 In fact, economic development of Arctic oil prospects has a long history of 
cooperation.  In 1920 an American drill team discovered oil along the Mackenzie River 
in the Northwest Territories.154  This is in direct contrast with what realism would 
predict. Neorealist theory would not predict concern for indigenous rights issues and 
environmental effects at the expense of pursuing economic interests.  Through the Arctic 
Council, both states have confirmed their intentions to restrain development to some 
degree.  This voluntary constraint on power is problematic for neorealist theory.  Clinton 
era Arctic development policy also demonstrated restraint and the subordinating of 
economics to environmental concerns.  In 1996 Congress passed a bill that authorized oil 
and gas development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which is expected to 
contain 11.6–31.5 billion barrels of oil.155  President Clinton vetoed the bill citing the 
ANWR sections as the reason.156 
4. Military Force 
Military cooperation was the initial basis of the post World War II relationship in 
the Arctic.  As the Polar Sea narrative details, Canada wants to exert control over the 
Northwest Passage, but the concept of a military challenge to the United States over 
access is near zero.  Keohane and Nye hypothesize that military power is not fungible 
under the conditions of complex interdependence.157  When military force is ineffective, 
the conventional notions about power and its influence on disputes between states is 
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minimized or marginalized.158  The possibility of armed conflict between Canada and the 
United States is exceptionally remote.  Ultimately, the relationship between Canada and 
the United States is compatible with all three of the core assumptions of the complex 
interdependence framework. 
F. CONCLUSION  
Some aspects of neorealism theory were applicable in the case study, the U.S.-
Canada relationship in relation to a threatening Russian presence in the Arctic did meet 
Walt’s framework for a “balancing” Alliance.  Ultimately, neorealism was unable to 
properly describe the U.S.-Canada relationship in the Arctic.   Additionally, the role of 
military power in the structure and outcome of the Arctic dispute did not provide accurate 
predictions.  If realism held, the vastly more powerful U.S. position in the relationship 
would have resulted in a favorable resolution of the longstanding dispute over the 
characterization of the Northwest Passage.  For Russia, even its emphasis on the Arctic as 
a resource base and, to some extent, its militarization of the Arctic still falls short of 
realist predictions.  Instead of unilaterally exerting sovereignty over the Arctic, Russia 
has filed a claim under UNCLOS provisions to the International Seabed Authority to 
extend its territory.159  By allowing states to pursue national interest goals, but bounding 
them within the rules of international regimes neoliberal institutionalism more accurately 
describes the state behavior in the Arctic. The North American allies also operate in 
compliance with the UNCLOS regime, although they disagree on the legal definition of 
the Northwest Passage.   
This chapter argued that the relationship matched the three basic assumptions of 
complex interdependence, but it also highlighted the different measures of power that 
interdependence uses.  “A useful beginning in political analysis of international 
interdependence can be made by thinking of asymmetrical interdependencies as sources 
of power among actors.”160  In this case, the relationship between the two North 
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American allies is sufficiently interdependent that the power relationship described by 
realism fails to produce the expected outcome.  Instead, it can be deduced from the long-
standing nature of the disagreement and the failure to resolve it, that the power 
relationship does not reflect realist predictions based off security and economic measures 
of power.  Canada’s oil supply and the vast trade ties between the two states severely 
weaken the dominant U.S. military power position.  Once military force is not a viable 
option for dispute resolution in an interstate relationship it becomes highly marginalized.  
Moreover, the expansive political and cultural integration of the two countries is 





This thesis has argued that the opening of the Arctic has the potential to bring 
dormant or unresolved issues to the forefront as states compete for maritime shipping 
economies and access to hydrocarbon natural resources on the continental shelves.  In 
light of the particular maritime characteristics of the region this thesis identified two 
specific areas of sovereignty disputes as appropriate case studies for patterns of 
cooperation and conflict: border disputes and navigable waters disputes.  By investigating 
these two specific cases of sovereignty disputes in the Arctic within the broader context 
of the issues at stake in the region, this thesis attempted to move beyond the simple 
characterizations of the region that continually emerge in publication.   
The selection of case studies was significant.  In the case of Norway and Russia, 
the emergence of cooperation on the Barents Sea boundary defies most conflict-oriented 
expectations.  By understanding how two Cold-War adversaries settled a long standing 
boundary dispute in the Arctic at the same time that the so called “new cold war” in the 
Arctic was heating up, this thesis challenged fundamental neorealist predictions for the 
region.  The relationship between the United States and Canada also represents a key test 
for international relations theory in the Arctic.  Although the long-standing alliance and 
cooperation between the two North American states is generally over determined in both 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, the fact that agreement on the legal definition 
over the Northwest Passage remains disputed reinforces the need to investigate the 
relationship in the Arctic with international relations theories.   
B. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. Neorealism 
This thesis investigated several neorealist predictions for the region.  First, that an 
opening Arctic would result in states pursuing resources and economic development of 
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the region to boost national power.  There was clear evidence in both case studies that all 
four states were interested in pursuing national interests tied directly to both latent and 
military power factors as predicted by realists.   Second, the prediction that pursuit of 
economic development would bring increased human activity and increased security 
threats to the region, and with it an increase in military activity in the region and the 
development of military capability for Arctic operations.  The results here were less clear.  
There was evidence of some security competition in the Arctic between Russia and 
Norway.  In the North American case, Canada has boosted military investment for Arctic 
operations, while the United States have not made significant efforts to securitize the 
region beyond existing capabilities.  Third, this thesis investigated the power structure of 
the Arctic and found that Russia’s geographic, economic, and demographic domination 
of the Arctic should result in balancing behavior from Norway, Canada, and the United 
States.  These predictions were not clearly evident.  While both Norway and Canada 
belong to a legacy alliance via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that alliance is not 
a significant actor in the region nor did changes in the Arctic and the resulting structural 
changes result in the predicted state behavior. Crucially, the unbalanced power structure 
of the Arctic did not lead to significant gains for Russia in the negotiation of the Barents 
Sea Treaty with Norway.  Finally, realism predicts that states should ignore or break the 
rules established by international regimes and institutions when it is in their interest to do 
so.  There was very little evidence of rule breaking across both case studies.  The illegal 
penetration of Russian military aircraft into NATO airspace in Europe was the only 
significant example of rule breaking behavior.   
2. Neoliberal institutionalism 
The neoliberal theoretical framework investigated allowed for many of the 
neorealist assumptions about state priorities on elements of power, but was able to more 
accurately describe the behavior of the states in pursuing those interests.  First, this thesis 
investigated the assumption that states act rationally and that rule-based regimes allow 
them to benefit over time through cooperation, and that those benefits outweigh the costs 
of constraining their behavior in the short-term.  This was clearly evident in the Barents 
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Sea Treaty case as the dispute is grounded in claims to resource rights yet the dispute 
clearly evolved with the international regime of the Law of the Sea.  Additionally, the 
cooperative spirit of the Arctic Council and the Ilulissat Declaration were key in shaping 
the Arctic competition between Norway and Russia into cooperation.  The role the Arctic 
Council plays in providing a forum for discussion and bargaining, and its ability to 
provide reciprocity and future interactions, ultimately enhanced cooperation in the Arctic 
region.  In general, competition in the Arctic has been bounded and conflict has been 
absent. 
C. THE U.S.-CANADA RELATIONSHIP 
This thesis has identified the ability of neoliberal institutionalism to incorporate 
key elements of neorealism, yet offers the possibility of sustained cooperation in the 
Arctic.  How does this shape Arctic sovereignty disputes? Keohane and Nye state:  
As military force is devalued, militarily strong states will find it more 
difficult to use their overall dominance to control outcomes on issues in 
which they are weak.  And since the distribution of power resources in 
trade, shipping, or oil, for example, may be quite different, patterns of 
outcomes and distinctive political processes are likely to vary from one set 
of issues to another.  If force were readily applicable, and military security 
were the highest foreign policy goal, these variations in the issue 
structures of power would not matter very much.161  
The inability for the United States to convince Canada to recognize its 
characterization of the Northwest Passage as an international strait is strong evidence for 
arguing that the relationship is one that is accurately described by complex 
interdependence and supports the neoliberal institutionalism argument.  They go on to 
state that: 
Even for countries whose relations approximate complex interdependence, 
two serious qualifications remain: (1) drastic social and political change 
could cause force again to become an important direct instrument of 
policy; and (2) even when elites’ interests are complementary, a country 
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that uses military force to protect another may have significant political 
influence over the other country.162   
While this analysis should dampen conclusions about geopolitical conflict in the 
Arctic between the United States and Canada, that relationship is unique in the world.  It 
would be highly problematic to extrapolate these specific conclusions to the other Arctic 
states.   
The North American Arctic case study still highlights important factors that reject 
realist assumptions about state behavior.  Clearly military power has no utility in the 
relationship.  Additionally, neither state has stepped outside the legal boundaries of the 
Law of the Sea during the dispute over the Northwest Passage.  Despite clear latent 
power advantages to securing the use of this shipping route, each state has maintained its 
differing legal interpretation while seeking to avoid conflicts.   
D. RUSSIA, NORWAY, AND THE BARENTS SEA DISPUTE 
Understanding Russia’s approach to the Arctic is the most problematic for 
scholars and security analysts.  The state pursues realist sources of power in the Arctic 
and its geographic, economic, and demographic domination of the region create a 
perceived threat, even when its actions are cooperative.   The signing of the Illulisat 
Declaration brings with it a promise to resolve disputes utilizing the Law of the sea 
framework, and to pursue resolutions in a cooperative framework.  The case study clearly 
demonstrated that these international regimes significantly shaped the dispute and 
ultimately enabled their resolution. 
However, Russian reorganization and military operations in the Arctic in August 
2011 coincide with lead up to UNCLOS continental shelf EEZ extension claim 
submissions.  A realist analysis would point to this as evidence that Russia is prepared to 
pursue naked self-interest through military power to protect its national interests in the 
Arctic if its claims are rejected.  Russia could be preparing for a negative decision on its 
EEZ extension claims by committing military resources to the region.  The Barents case 
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study demonstrates that military power had little influence on the dispute settlement, but 
realists would argue that they offered cooperation in the Barents as a sacrifice in order to 
increase its cache for the upcoming Arctic territory extension.  Ultimately, the future will 
always hold a degree of uncertainty.  However, the Barents Sea case study still offers a 
clear victory of neoliberal institutionalism claims about cooperative interstate behavior.  
Norway and Russia seemed to have internalized these lessons as evidenced by continuing 
cooperation and engagement between the two states on Arctic matters. 
E. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
The international regime established by the UNCLOS serves as the cornerstone of 
Arctic geopolitics, but its conventions leave room for disputes in interpretations.  Despite 
the presence of sovereignty disputes in the Arctic, the extent that states shape their claims 
in the language of the Law of the Sea vindicates neoliberal institutional claims.  
Additionally, the Arctic Council has had a strong role in providing a forum for Arctic 
states to cooperate in an effective manner.  When combined with other institutions that 
enhance cooperation over specific resources like fisheries, these Arctic institutions create 
multiple channels of cooperation in a competitive region.   
The most powerful evidence in support of neoliberal institutionalism’s hypothesis 
on international regimes is manifested in the Ilulissat Declaration.  Not only is it a formal, 
legal agreement to pursue cooperative resolution to disputes in the Arctic, the language of 
the agreement is essentially underpinned by neoliberal institutionalist theory.   The Arctic 
Council relies on consensus and repeated interaction to increase the benefits of 
cooperation on Arctic issues and create an incentive to comply with established rules.  It 
has already generated legal obligations for cooperation on search and rescue. 
F. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As discussed in Chapter II, states are generally setting cooperation as a policy 
priority in the Arctic.  However, regional military cooperation has been limited.  In the 
meantime, states are preparing to operate in the “new ocean.”  The military certainly has 
a role in the Arctic.  However, as the thesis describes, the degree in which the region is 
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militarized (even in the absence of outright conflict) shapes the Arctic in ways that 
realists predict.  Russian Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov of the Ministry of 
Defense justified his decision to create an Arctic Spetsnaz unit by citing U.S. exercises in 
Alaska in 2008, which involved 5,000 military personnel.163  This summer saw 
additional exercises and attention to the Arctic by the U.S. Navy.  Acknowledging that 
unilateral military operations may be sub-optimal is a natural outgrowth of this research. 
The military has a role to play, doing the expensive and dangerous business of opening 
the Arctic frontier.  However, an emphasis should be placed on operating in a multilateral 
military environment, including annual international exercises to continue a cooperative 
spirit and to avoid unnecessary security competition.   
As we look toward the future of the Arctic it is important to understand the 
fallibility of predictions.164  Even recent articles discussing the “future” of the arctic with 
regard to shipping and resource exploration are rapidly becoming out of date.  As of 
Summer 2011, Exxon and Rosneft signed a deal to begin developing Arctic oil resources, 
the sea ice reached another near record minimum, and several ships transited the northern 
sea route to from Murmansk to the far East.  The future of the Arctic is here, now. 
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